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ARTICLES 
PRIVATE SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL CRISES 
GREGORY R. DAY† 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts of law are poorly equipped to hear allegations that a 
multinational corporation (“MNC”) has transgressed human 
rights1 or committed other global torts.2  This is because most 
abuses occur in the developing world where local authorities lack 
the capacity and political will to prosecute western corporations.3  
In fact, some developing countries explicitly refuse to regulate 
† Assistant Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Spears School of Business, 
Oklahoma State University. This Article benefited from helpful comments and 
suggestions offered at the Southeastern Academy of Legal Studies in Business 
Conference, for which the author is extremely grateful. Numerous lawyers, 
professors, and human rights practitioners dedicated their time and attention to this 
work, including Bob Thompson, Claes Cronstedt, Emma Lindsay, Rob Wayss, 
Michael Goldhaber, Haskell Murray, Tim Samples, Thomas Curry, Laurie Lucas, 
Jack Wroldsen, Kurtis Mason, Nadine Robles, and Shawna Bray. 
1 Human rights abuses are torts. Accordingly, this Article frequently uses the 
term “human rights” due to the topic’s saliency and for the sake of simplicity. 
However, the discussion is not meant to be limited to only human rights abuses, 
considering that the same legal analysis is generally applicable to transnational 
torts. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the 
Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1091 (2014) (“Human 
rights violations are transnational torts. Torture is assault and battery. Terrorism is 
wrongful death. Slavery is false imprisonment. Federal law concedes as much . . . .”). 
2 See Simon Chesterman, Oil and Water: Regulating the Behavior of 
Multinational Corporations Through Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L & POL. 307, 307 
(2004) (discussing the difficulties associated with courts sanctioning corporate 
human rights transgressions, especially oil companies, in the developing world, 
difficulties that are due to the legal implications of state sovereignty and the relative 
power advantages enjoyed by oil companies over developing countries). 
3 See Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert, Litigation for Overseas Corporate Human 
Rights Abuses in the European Union: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, 40 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 939, 939–40 (2009) (“[Developing countries] hardly regulate the 
activities of transnational corporations ([M]NCs). In some instances, they do so on 
purpose in order to attract foreign direct investment. In other instances, a 
regulatory vacuum arises because of a nonfunctioning or corrupt government. Either 
way, vulnerable populations may fall victim to the practices of [MNCs].”). 
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MNCs in hopes of attracting international business and 
investment.4  Although victims and their families also file human 
rights lawsuits in European and North American courts, 
jurisdictional and sovereignty obstacles typically prevent western 
nations from adjudicating their claims.5  The result is a 
landscape in which MNCs rarely suffer liability for their parts in 
human rights abuses6—and without the threat of liability, 
commentators assert that little encourages MNCs to adopt 
socially desirable behaviors.7 
The historical record is replete with examples.  Shell Oil 
allegedly helped the Nigerian government violently suppress 
local protestors,8 and California’s Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation contributed to the bombing of a Colombian  
village—both companies avoided liability.9  In fact, human rights 
4 Id. at 939. 
5 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (ruling that 
general jurisdiction is only supported when a corporation is essentially “at home” in 
the forum court and “at home” typically refers to the state where the corporation has 
its principle place of business or is incorporated, or the specific incident must have 
sufficient contacts with the forum court); see also Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of 
Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of 
the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 141, 153–54 (2001) 
(noting that personal jurisdiction is largely grounded in the idea of physical presence 
in a state); Wouters & Ryngaert, supra note 3, at 946–47 (2009) (discussing that 
European Union countries will not hear a torts claim unless a sufficient “nexus” 
exists between the tort and forum court). 
6 Robert C. Bird et al., Corporate Voluntarism and Liability for Human Rights 
in a Post-Kiobel World, 102 KY. L.J. 601, 603 (2013–14) (stating that “the legal door 
[has] substantially closed on corporate liability” with respect to human rights abuses 
committed abroad). 
7 See, e.g., Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking and 
Forced Labor: Why Current Theories of Corporate Liability Do Not Work, 43 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 1047, 1048 (2013) (detailing the ability of corporations to evade liability for 
human rights abuses, including trafficking and forced labor); see also Dennis 
Hayashi, Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment Industry: A 
Proposed Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 195, 199–
200 (1992); Mara Theophila, “Moral Monsters” Under the Bed: Holding Corporations 
Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2862 (2011) (noting that considering the 
recent limitations imposed on the Alien Tort Statute, corporations will rarely face 
liability for their torts and crimes committed in the developing world). 
8 See Jena Martin Amerson, What’s in a Name? Transnational Corporations as 
Bystanders Under International Law, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2011) 
(recounting Shell Oil’s role and legal status in Nigeria as the Nigerian government 
violently squelched local protests). 
9 Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. 
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 136 S. Ct. 690 (2015) (noting that Occidental 
supplied material support for the Colombian government in hopes of protecting the 
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abuses are currently emerging in Qatar, implicating a number of 
companies building FIFA’s 2022 World Cup stadiums.10  Reports 
from Qatar suggest that low-skilled Indian and Nepalese 
laborers are enticed to work on the stadiums, forced to surrender 
their passports upon arrival.11  Once trapped in the country, 
immigrant workers are subjected to treacherous labor conditions 
described as an ongoing human rights crisis by employment and 
construction companies.12  Over 500 Indians have already died 
from work-related incidents13 while another 4,000 are expected to 
perish before the World Cup begins.14  But notably there is little 
chance that a court in Qatar, or any other country, will hear the 
victims’ claims.15 
While this legal vacuum has, and continues, to draw 
international outrage, arbitration is quietly emerging as perhaps 
the most effective means to redress torts and crimes committed 
by corporate entities.16  The use of arbitration as a human rights 
tool is particularly counterintuitive considering the perception 
company’s oil pipeline and dismissing the plaintiffs’ Alien Tort Statute claim due to 
a lack of jurisdiction and state law tort claims upon international comity). 
10 See Jeremy Stahl, The Qatar World Cup Is a Human Rights Catastrophe. It’s 
Time To Do Something About It., SLATE (May 14, 2014, 4:13 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/05/14/qatar_world_cup_migrant_worker
_abuses_fifa_needs_to_do_something_about_the.html. 
11 Qatar World Cup: Stadium Builders Working in ‘Sub-Human’ Conditions, 
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 6, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/10748171/Qatar-
World-Cup-Stadium-builders-working-in-sub-human-conditions.html (“[There is] 
evidence of migrant workers being lured to the Gulf state by the promise of good 
salaries, only to have their passports taken away so they cannot return home.”). 
12 See Nigel G. Crocombe, Note, Building a New Future: The 2022 FIFA World 
Cup as a Potential Catalyst for Labor Reform in Qatar, 37 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 33, 44 (2014) (reviewing the host of restrictions placed upon migrant workers). 
13 Owen Gibson, More Than 500 Indian Workers Have Died in Qatar Since 2012, 
Figures Show, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2014/feb/18/qatar-world-cup-india-migrant-worker-deaths (reporting the 
Indian Embassy’s research that at least 500 Indian migrant workers constructing 
the World Cup stadiums have died, mainly due to poor working conditions). 
14 ITUC, THE CASE AGAINST QATAR 14 (2014), available at http://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/the_case_against_qatar_en_web170314.pdf. 
15 So far, it does not appear that a credible lawsuit has been filed in Qatar or 
elsewhere seeking redress for deaths and injuries suffered by a migrant worker 
working on Qatar’s stadiums. See generally Crocombe, supra note 12, at 35 
(explaining the lack of legal protections and causes of action afforded to migrant 
workers in Qatar). 
16 ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH 2 (May 13, 2013), 
http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf [hereinafter 
BANGLADESH ACCORD] (noting that a “Steering Committee” is the first arbiter of 
disputes, and appeals must be submitted to binding arbitration). 
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that private dispute resolution is substantially biased in favor of 
business interests.17  For instance, contracts of adhesion often 
include provisions obligating less sophisticated parties to 
arbitrate in tribunals manipulated by resourceful companies to 
exclude rules of procedural and substantive fairness.18  Other 
times, the process completely divests victims of the right to seek 
redress from MNCs.19  So if arbitration now offers a remedy to 
victims in the developing world, this Article asks not only what 
has changed, but also why might arbitration be better able than 
courts of law to resolve human rights cases. 
Supported by interviews with prominent lawyers and 
practitioners, this Article finds that courts of law are rarely able 
to hear certain types of disputes, including human rights cases, 
over which arbitral tribunals may preside.  This is because courts 
of law—by virtue of being branches of government—can 
undermine international peace and cooperation when ruling on 
matters involving another country’s government, laws, and 
formal acts.20  Arbitral tribunals, on the contrary, are private 
17 See, e.g., Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins To Protect 
Consumers from Significantly One-Sided Arbitration Clauses Within Contracts of 
Adhesion, 91 NEB. L. REV. 666, 683 (2013) (discussing how companies use contracts 
of adhesion to trap consumers into private forums designed to benefit businesses). 
18 Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 157, 158 (2006) (arguing that the economics of binding arbitration 
agreements, with respect to consumer credit cards, strips these companies of 
accountability arising from malfeasance); see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. 
Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business 
Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 103 (2004); 
Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not? Class Action Waivers in Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 
218 (2008) (arguing that corporations “insulate themselves” from liability by 
drafting binding arbitration clauses that eliminate class action lawsuits). 
19 See LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KEVIN R. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 6 
(2003) (noting that pursuant to bilateral investment treaties, investor corporations 
operating in developing countries are often only amenable to international 
arbitration tribunals to remedy disputes and concluding that, since these tribunals 
rarely, if ever, provide legal standing to individuals, injured parties are virtually 
barred from seeking redress from multinational corporations (“MNCs”)). 
20 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) 
(stating that the act of a domestic court ruling on matters that occur in, and 
primarily concern, a foreign nation can instigate substantial foreign policy 
problems); Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through 
National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 451, 459 (2001) (“[B]ecause courts are public rather than private actors, foreign 
direct liability can generate foreign policy tensions. The fundamental principle of 
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actors, mitigating most practical and political dangers implicated 
by courts of law.21  In other words, private forums can act in 
certain areas where courts may not.  And now a collection of 
international organizations—including the United Nations,22 the 
International Labor Organization,23 and the International 
Olympic Committee24—have enacted, or are in the process of 
discussing, contracts and agreements that promote human rights 
enforced by arbitration.25  This Article details the untold story of 
how an effective model of human rights enforcement was 
innovated, where the rules of corporate responsibility are 
established by contract and noncompliance is sanctioned by 
private remedies. 
The contribution of this Article is both theoretical and 
practical.  Considering that MNCs rarely suffer liability abroad, 
this Article identifies an emerging, understudied type of 
international agreement able to hold MNCs responsible for torts 
in the developing world.26  On a theoretical level, the research 
herein identifies situations in which arbitral decisions are 
superior to judicial rulings.  This Article also advances the 
private dispute resolution literature, which has developed slowly 
territorial sovereignty underpins the right of host countries to regulate impacts and 
activities in their territory and prevents other states from interfering.”). 
21 See infra Part IV (discussing how certain qualities of private dispute 
resolution allow it to resolve matters involving international political difficulties in a 
manner that public courts of law may not). 
22 Infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text (discussing a proposal in front of 
the United Nations to create a regime enforcing human rights with binding 
arbitration). 
23 Infra notes 177–94 and accompanying text (noting that the International 
Labor Organization is a party to the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety 
which obligates apparel companies to certain labor standards, using international 
arbitration as an enforcement mechanism). 
24 Infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (noting that Olympic host city 
contracts now include human rights clauses and that all disputes arising under an 
Olympics contract must be submitted to the Court of Arbitration for Sport). 
25 Claes Cronstedt, Remarks at the United Nations Annual Forum on Business 
and Human Rights (Dec. 3, 2014) (proposing a United Nations regime to enforce 
corporate human rights standards using international arbitration); Panel discussing 
an International Arbitral Tribunal on Business and Human Rights, Side Session at 
the United Nations Business and Human Rights Forum (Dec. 3, 2014) [hereinafter 
U.N. Business and Human Rights Panel]. 
26 One article that provides substantial and meaningful insights was written by 
Professor Roger Alford, which considers how arbitration could be used to overcome 
the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity in actions against national governments 
and other sovereign actors accused of human rights abuses. Roger P. Alford, 
Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508 (2008). 
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due to arbitration’s private and confidential nature.27  The works 
that do discuss arbitration overwhelmingly assume that the 
process favors corporations, rarely mentioning arbitration’s 
socially desirable qualities.28  Thus, this Article offers a needed 
discussion of the advantages arbitration presents over courts of 
law, as well as the legal implications of litigating and arbitrating 
against MNCs. 
Part I explores the law of suing western companies in the 
developing world, adding policy insights to the reasons why 
MNCs are largely immune from suit.  Part II reviews the nature 
and efficacy of private remedies, which is accomplished by 
framing the arbitration debate from several perspectives.  Part 
III offers a discussion of recent contracts and international 
agreements that use arbitration as a means to hold MNCs 
accountable.  Then, Part IV discusses potential applications of 
such a mechanism, followed by the Conclusion. 
I. THE FUTILITY OF SUING CORPORATIONS OVER FOREIGN ACTS 
The legal framework governing international torts typically 
prevents courts of law from remedying, or even hearing, 
corporate human rights violations.29  It is rarely mentioned, 
however, that this landscape resulted from global necessity.  
Indeed, for the sake of greater international security, western 
nations are impeded from regulating even their own corporations  
 
 
 
 
27 See Stavros L. Brekoulakis, International Arbitration Scholarship and the 
Concept of Arbitration Law, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 745, 745 (2013) (stating that the 
scholarly community has produced little substantive work about the process of 
arbitration, limiting what is known about how arbitral panels resolve disputes). 
28 See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 17, at 666–67 (discussing the unjust 
consequences of binding arbitration clauses). 
29 See Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on 
Multinational Corporations: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 
18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1009, 1014–16 (2003) (explaining that enforcing sanctions 
against multinational corporations usually falls exclusively in the domain of the 
country located where the event occurred). However, since developing countries 
rarely prosecute MNCs, MNCs largely enjoy immunity for their international torts 
and crimes. Wouters & Ryngaert, supra note 3. 
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in the developing world.30  The following outlines the legal 
framework frustrating human rights victims and the historical 
developments that necessitated it. 
A. The Legal Framework of Human Rights and Corporations 
The most appropriate place to file a human rights lawsuit is 
wherever the underlying incident occurred, though most 
developing countries cannot or will not prosecute MNCs.31  A poor 
second option is to file suit in Europe, where the courts usually 
lack both jurisdiction and the ability to enforce a  
judgment.32  International authorities—including international 
governmental organizations and tribunals—are similarly 
limited.33  While the American legal system appears to be the 
30 See Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary 
Sovereignty Waiver”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by 
the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 403 (2005) (noting that 
the traditional view considers sovereignty to be “an important source of 
international stability and had served as a foundation for peace, democracy, and 
prosperity”). 
31 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
32 See Bridgeford, supra note 29; Shanaira Udwadia, Note, Corporate 
Responsibility for International Human Rights Violations, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
359, 368–69 (2004) (explaining that American courts cannot exert jurisdiction over 
foreign defendants when all acts and events occurred abroad). 
33 International authorities are ineffective in this arena. Because international 
laws, organizations, and agreements receive their power from individual nations and 
governments, acts on behalf of the international community can, likewise, threaten a 
nation’s sovereignty. For instance, the most well-known pact concerning business 
and human rights is the U.N.’s Guiding Principles, which is nonbinding and lacks 
the power to offer remedies to victims. Jena Martin Amerson, “The End of the 
Beginning?”: A Comprehensive Look at the U.N.’s Business and Human Rights 
Agenda from a Bystander Perspective, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 871, 874–75 
(2012); see also Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between International Law and 
Democratic Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 330 (2001) (remarking that western 
nations often use international law to violate the sovereignty of other nations); 
Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 329, 337 (2004) 
(explaining that certain acts on behalf of international organizations can effectively 
represent the acts of certain more powerful states). See generally Dan Sarooshi, The 
Essentially Contested Nature of the Concept of Sovereignty: Implications for the 
Exercise by International Organizations of Delegated Powers of Government, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1107, 1110, 1114 (2004) (reviewing the concept of states delegating 
sovereignty to international organizations but also the manner in which 
international organizations are representative of sovereign nations). The few 
international agreements addressing MNCs are entirely voluntary, powerless to 
punish noncompliance. See, e.g., Karin Dryhurst, Liability up the Supply Chain: 
Corporate Accountability for Labor Trafficking, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 653 
(2013) (noting that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights have only “symbolically” held 
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most receptive venue to bring suit over claims arising from 
foreign events,34 attracting a number of human rights lawsuits 
since the early 1980s,35 several principles and doctrines bar U.S. 
courts from exercising jurisdiction.36  Despite this, enterprising 
corporations liable for transgressions, stating that there can only be “public 
recommendations for companies found in violation of the guidelines, but the 
recommendations are not binding”); see also David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From 
Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at 
International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 946–47 (2004) (finding, with respect to the 
United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Enterprises, that while the pact “purport[s] not only to bind states, but also to 
place obligations on transnational corporations . . . . [,] [t]he Norms are, however, 
unclear as to how corporations could be held directly liable under international law 
for any breaches of these obligations”). Similarly, international law has chosen not to 
define MNCs as actors capable of violating the laws of nations. See Alan O. Sykes, 
Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute and 
Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2170–71 (2012) (providing the 
limited framework under which a corporation may be liable for acts violating 
international law, which includes when a corporation acts “under the color of state 
authority,” when the corporation violates a “universal concern,” and aiding and 
abetting state actors); see also Amerson, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that 
transnational corporations have often escaped liability and scrutiny by clinging to 
the belief that they are not state actors under the traditional sense and thus are 
bystanders to human rights abuses committed by governments); William S. Dodge, 
Corporate Liability Under Customary International Law, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1045, 
1046 (2012) (mentioning that, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit found that corporations are not susceptible to international law 
and that “no international tribunal of which we are aware has ever held a 
corporation liable for a violation of the laws of nations.” (quoting Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 132, 145 (2d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation 
mark omitted), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 33, at 935. 
In turn, both national and international forums have, so far, lacked the ability to 
hold MNCs accountable for atrocities committed in the developing world. 
34 Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The 
Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995, 997 (2015) 
(“There are several reasons why a plaintiff would want to bring suit in a U.S. forum. 
First, U.S. substantive law is thought to be more generous than the laws of other 
countries. Second, U.S. procedural law—in particular, notice pleading, liberal 
discovery, and aggregate (class action) litigation—provides plaintiffs substantial 
leverage in pleading, proving, trying to a favorable verdict, and settling their cases. 
Third, U.S. damages law—especially punitive damages and substantial jury 
awards—present the potential for a windfall for plaintiffs or, at a minimum, 
significant leverage to force defendants to settle.” (footnotes omitted)). 
35 See Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of 
Multinational Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the 
Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259, 259 (2012) (noting that, although 
the United States’ willingness has recently waned, “[f]or several decades, the United 
States has acted as the global leader in imposing accountability on multinational 
corporations in the area of human rights”). 
36 See generally John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: The 
Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 
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lawyers continue to initiate human rights lawsuits in American 
courts, asserting a number of novel legal theories based upon 
criminal, contract, and tort laws.37  But as this Section 
demonstrates, rarely do these lawsuits succeed, leaving few 
avenues for foreign parties to remedy corporate torts and crimes. 
For example, a number of American statutes ostensibly 
support a cause of action over foreign acts.38  The problem is that 
American laws are presumed to have a territorial reach 
extending only as far as the United States’ sovereign borders.39  
That is, unless Congress has used express language to arrange 
otherwise.40  Consider the most well-known human rights 
statute, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).  Congress enacted the 
ATS as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,41 providing that “[t]he 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”42  The ATS laid 
dormant for almost 200 years43 until two Paraguayan citizens 
living in the United States successfully sued a former 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1707 (2013) (discussing the modern, limited extent of personal 
jurisdiction with respect to court’s ability to adjudicate international torts). 
37 See, e.g., Ebrahim v. Shell Oil Company, 847 F. Supp. 65, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1994) 
(ruling that an American worker who was injured in Syria may not sue his 
employer’s parent company and other associated companies because, without 
piercing the corporate veil, the independent legal existences of the corporations may 
not be jettisoned); Theophila, supra note 7. 
38 United States v. Dawn, 129 F.3d 878, 882 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Generally 
speaking, Congress has the authority to apply its laws, including criminal statutes, 
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States, to the extent that 
extraterritorial application is consistent with the principles of international law.”). 
39 See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (“The presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been applied in U.S. courts for more than a century, receiving 
perhaps its most prominent endorsement from no less than Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.: ‘[A]ll legislation is prima facie territorial.’ In the 1990s, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reaffirmed this principle in its modern formulation: ‘[L]egislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ And in 2013, Chief Justice Roberts 
quoted Justice Scalia for the proposition that: ‘When a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.’ ” (footnotes omitted)). 
40 Id. 
41 See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the 
Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1609 (2014) (providing an insightful 
review of the Alien Tort Statute). 
42 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
43 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (“Passed as 
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS was invoked twice in the late 18th 
century, but then only once more over the next 167 years.”). 
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Paraguayan police chief also living domestically, alleging that he 
tortured and murdered their family members.44  After Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala,45 similar victims filed ATS cases, though questions 
persisted about the statute’s effect over exclusively foreign 
incidents and parties.46  The Supreme Court settled this debate 
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,47 ruling that a collection of 
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations could not be held liable 
in the United States for aiding and abetting the Nigerian 
government’s campaign of “beating, raping, killing, and arresting 
residents and destroying or looting property” because such acts 
were perpetrated in Nigeria, outside of American  
jurisdiction.48  While commentators fervently contest Kiobel’s 
result49—remarking that corporations now enjoy de facto 
immunity for acts in violation of international law—it must be 
noted that the Supreme Court ruled unanimously.50 
In a similar fashion, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 200051 (“Victims Act”) imposes civil penalties on 
persons caught trafficking humans or profiting from their forced 
labor.52  The law’s reach was limited after a group of Liberian 
laborers in John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp.53 alleged that certain 
American corporations staffed the Firestone Rubber Plantation 
44 Id. at 1675. 
45 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
46 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 321–22 (2d Cir. 
2007) (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the 
questions and issues involved with finding a corporation liable under customary 
international law and, thus, the Alien Tort Statute). 
47 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
48 Id. at 1662–63. 
49 See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 41, at 1611 (insisting that the Supreme 
Court has misinterpreted the Alien Tort Statute). 
50 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“[A]ll the relevant conduct took place outside of 
the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application.”). 
51 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1590 (2012). 
52 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (2012) (“Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor 
or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following 
means—(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of 
physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or 
threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse 
or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or 
pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform 
such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or 
physical restraint, shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).”). 
53 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 994 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
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near Harleb, Liberia, with trafficked adults and children, 
procured from local chiefs.54  The plaintiffs argued that the 
Victims Act overcomes the presumption against 
extraterritoriality because human trafficking inherently takes on 
an international dynamic, which Congress contemplated when 
enacting the statute.55  The district court disagreed, ruling that 
the Victims Act lacks explicit language extending jurisdiction 
internationally, necessitating Bridgestone’s dismissal.56 
Even when a statute creates extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
some laws pertain only to natural born humans as opposed to 
corporations and organizations.  Had the plaintiffs in Kiobel 
established a sufficient nexus with the United States, questions 
would have remained about the ATS’s application to 
corporations.57  A similar example is the Torture Victims 
Protection Act58 (“TVPA”), which permits injured parties to 
allege—despite a lack of contacts with the United States—that a 
foreign official in her formal capacity committed acts of 
extrajudicial killing or torture.59  For instance, in Doe VIII v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp.,60 the plaintiffs alleged that Exxon Mobil 
aided and abetted foreign officials who violated the TVPA when 
the company hired a local security force, known to have 
committed prior human rights abuses, to guard the company’s 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1001–02 (“The international dimensions of the problems of trafficking 
and forced labor do not support a departure from the usual presumption against 
extraterritorial application for section 1589.”). 
56 Id. at 1000 (“[T]he court must be guided by the ‘longstanding principle of 
American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is 
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ ”). 
57 See Sykes, supra note 33, at 2162–63 (discussing recent cases and United 
States appellate circuit courts that have found that the Alien Tort Statute does not 
govern corporations, but instead, only natural born humans, citing in particular the 
Second Circuit’s holding in Kiobel. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013)). 
58 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012). 
59 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 
73 (1992) (“Liability.—[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or 
color of law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a 
civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to 
extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s 
legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for 
wrongful death.”). 
60 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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Indonesian gas facility.61  The plaintiffs claimed that this security 
team was under Exxon’s exclusive control when it, again, 
engaged in a “systemic campaign of extermination” including 
“extrajudicial killing, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual 
violence, and kidnaping.”62  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit found that only an 
“individual” could violate the TVPA, which excluded corporations 
from the statute’s reach.63  This decision barred the plaintiffs 
from establishing liability despite the severity of Exxon’s alleged 
acts.64  The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s TVPA 
interpretation in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority,65 ruling that 
Congress clearly sought to exclude corporations from the 
statute’s scope.66  Thus, in light of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and other limiting principles, American 
statutes rarely redress parties injured abroad.67 
Another strategy is to allege that the injured party and 
defendant company had a contractual relationship based upon 
events or circumstances arising in the United States.68  This 
argument generally fails as well.  Most western companies 
operating abroad create subsidiary or affiliated entities to 
undertake their foreign operations.  The hitch is that a 
corporation’s legal existence is considered independent from all 
61 Id. at 15–16. See generally Brenner A. Allen, A Cause of Action Against 
Private Contractors and the U.S. Government for Freedom of Speech Violations in 
Iraq, 31. N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 535, 560–61 (2005) (discussing the Torture 
Victims Prevention Act in greater detail). 
62 Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 16 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
63 Id. at 57–58 (“Congress’s use of the word ‘individual’ indicated that it did not 
intend for the TVPA to apply to corporations or other organizations. . . . [T]here is no 
basis in the statutory text for permitting vicarious corporate liability.”). 
64 Id. at 73 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he TVPA does not allow 
corporate liability or aiding and abetting liability.”). 
65 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710–11 (2012). 
66 Id. at 1710 (“Petitioners’ final argument is that the Act would be rendered 
toothless by a construction of ‘individual’ that limits liability to natural 
persons. . . . We acknowledge petitioners’ concerns about the limitations on recovery. 
But they are ones that Congress imposed and that we must respect.”). 
67 See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 33, at 939–40 (explaining extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and the difficulties of finding corporations responsible); Ward, supra 
note 20, at 454 (discussing the difficulties of holding corporations liable for acts 
committed abroad). 
68 See, e.g., Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(stating that the plaintiffs sought to establish that they were third-party 
beneficiaries under contracts between Walmart and the companies operating the 
factories through which they contracted). 
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other companies, despite whether they share common 
shareholders and directors, or belong to a parent and subsidiary 
relationship.69  Injured parties are thus impeded from holding 
corporations liable for acts committed by other legal entities with 
which they have contracted.70  Proving otherwise requires a 
petitioner to pierce the corporate veil, which occurs only in the 
most extreme circumstances.71  Take Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. for example.72  There, the plaintiffs—a group of Asian, 
African, and Latin American factory workers—alleged that 
Walmart contracted factory work out to companies in the 
developing world that managed inhumane working 
environments.73  But since independent factories employed the 
plaintiffs as part of Walmart’s global supply chain, the laborers 
appeared to lack a contractual relationship with Walmart.74  The 
plaintiffs sought to overcome this burden by noting that Walmart 
had enacted and ignored several internal policies governing 
contractee workplace conditions.75  Because only a factory worker 
could benefit from these standards, the plaintiffs argued that 
they entailed third-party beneficiaries under Walmart’s global 
supply contracts, which would give rise to liability in the United 
States.76  The court disagreed though, ruling that Walmart 
69 See Dryhurst, supra note 33, at 654–55. 
70 See, e.g., Ebrahim v. Shell Oil Co., 847 F. Supp. 65, 66–67 (S.D. Tex. 1994) 
(ruling that an American hurt in Syria cannot sue affiliated and subsidiary 
companies of the company responsible since “[a] wholly-owned subsidiary of a 
company is a distinct legal entity, responsible for its own wrongs” and noting that, 
even if the plaintiff were suing the correct party, the plaintiff would still be unable 
to assert jurisdiction over the companies in an American court, considering the 
injuries and events all took place in Syria). 
71 Id.; see Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: 
Does Corporate Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 137 
(2013) (“However, for victims of human rights abuses, limited liability within the 
corporate group can present significant obstacles to obtaining tort-based remedies 
from the ultimate parent(s) of the corporate group. Courts have elected to ‘pierce the 
corporate veil’ and reach the assets of a corporate parent only in exceptional 
circumstances involving abuse of the corporate form where the separation between 
the corporation and its shareholders produces inequitable results.”). 
72 572 F.3d 677. 
73 Id. at 680. 
74 Id. at 680, 682 (noting that the workers were employed by companies 
contracted to supply Walmart with manufactured goods). 
75 Id. at 680. 
76 Id. at 681–82 (“Plaintiffs argue that Wal-Mart promised the suppliers that it 
would monitor the suppliers’ compliance with the Standards, and that Plaintiffs are 
third-party beneficiaries of that promise to monitor.”). 
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reserved only the right to monitor contractees, which  
is substantially different from creating a legal  
obligation.77  Alternatively, since Walmart had not exacted an 
“ ‘immediate level of “day-to-day” ’ control over [the] supplier’s 
employees,” the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their 
relationship amounted to an implied employment contract.78 
Human rights victims are also seldom successful under 
American tort laws.79  This is because courts must either dismiss 
international tort claims or apply the laws of the nation where 
the incident occurred.  In Bridgestone, the Liberian rubber 
workers alleged that Firestone committed acts of negligence and 
recklessness, but their complaint ultimately failed to “articulate[] 
a viable basis for applying California law or Indiana law to the 
management of the Plantation in Liberia.”80  Likewise, the Exxon 
Mobil court found, pursuant to the Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws,81 that “subject only to rare exceptions, the local law of the 
state where the conduct and injury occurred will be  
applied.”82  Indeed, this choice of law analysis often serves as a de 
facto barrier to liability since most developing countries lack the 
types of tort laws that can establish MNC liability.83  Other 
77 Id. at 682 (“Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to support the conclusion 
that Wal-Mart and the suppliers intended for Plaintiffs to have a right of 
performance against Wal-Mart under the supply contracts.”). 
78 Id. at 683 (“Such supply contract terms do not constitute an ‘immediate level 
of “day-to-day” ’ control over a supplier’s employees so as to create an employment 
relationship between a purchaser and a supplier’s employees.”). 
79 See Alford, supra note 1, at 1089 (discussing how the Supreme Court recently, 
and severely, limited the ability of U.S. courts to hear international torts claims and 
noting that “[a]s such, international human rights litigation as currently practiced 
in the United States is dead”). 
80 John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1024 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (“When there is no 
such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of 
the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative 
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the 
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular 
field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the 
determination and application of the law to be applied.”). 
82 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145) (internal quotation mark 
omitted), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
83 See Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward Global 
Regulations of Transnational Corporations, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 195, 198 (2010) 
(remarking that many foreign nations lack the judicial system to regulate MNCs, 
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times, American courts entirely dismiss tort claims arising out of 
foreign events; this is because the doctrine of international 
comity encourages judicial deference to whichever legal system 
bears the strongest connection to the complained of incident.84  In 
Mujica v. AirScan Inc.,85 for example, a Californian oil company 
helped the Colombian military bomb a Colombian village in 
hopes of protecting an oil pipeline.86  When the victims filed suit 
in California—due to the Colombian government’s refusal to 
prosecute—the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit determined that Colombia’s judicial system had the 
greatest relationship to, and interest in, the massacre.87  Since 
Colombia’s court system was considered adequate, the Ninth 
Circuit dismissed Mujica.88  Other doctrines similarly encourage 
or require courts to reject lawsuits implicating another country’s 
government, laws, or actions,89 including the doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity,90 the act of state doctrine,91 and forum non 
conveniens.92 
and in fact, developing countries actually have incentives to avoid enacting and 
enforcing laws that require MNCs to abide by human rights). 
84 Carlee M. Hobbs, Note, The Conflict Between the Alien Tort Statute Litigation 
and Foreign Amnesty Laws, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 516 (2010) 
(“International comity is ‘the recognition which one nation allows within its territory 
to the legislative, executive[,] or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.’ ” (quoting Hilton v. Guyton, 
159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)). 
85 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Mujica v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 136 S. Ct. 690 (2015). 
86 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168–69 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Mujica v. Airscan Inc. 771 F.3d 580. 
87 AirScan, 771 F.3d at 611–12. 
88 Id. at 613–14. 
89 See generally Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the International Application of 
the Sherman Act: Encouraging the Courts To Enter the Political Arena, 4 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 130 (1982) (providing a broad discussion of how these doctrines limit 
a plaintiff’s ability to file suit in U.S. courts based upon, or involving, events 
occurring internationally). 
90 The modern view of sovereign immunity is the “restrictive” theory, which 
provides: 
[A] foreign state would enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of national 
courts for its “sovereign” actions but not for its “private” acts. Importantly, 
application of this theory had the effect of transferring disputes involving 
foreign states from the diplomatic arena to adjudicatory forums—in 
particular, to litigation in national courts. In the words of one 
commentator, “The embrace of the restrictive theory of the immunity of 
foreign states around the globe is representative of the ongoing legalization 
of international relations.” 
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And thus, when taking into account the limitations borne to 
American statutes and the protections afforded by corporate law, 
western companies are virtually immune from liability arising 
out of foreign torts and crimes—even when the alleged acts entail 
torture or murder.  These harsh results, however, are the product 
of important, sage policies. 
B. The Policies Underlying the Barriers to Human Rights 
Litigation 
While this regulatory vacuum is the subject of much 
consternation, it is seldom discussed how it is rooted in global 
necessity.93  After years of European fighting, the international 
community determined that international conflict is primarily 
caused by countries meddling in each other’s affairs.94  To 
ameliorate this danger, each state is considered sovereign, vested 
with plenary authority to promulgate rules and regulations in its 
own territorial borders.95  Importantly, as the Supreme Court 
Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 820–
21 (2012) (footnote omitted) (quoting JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN 
GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 5 (2d ed. 2003)). 
91 See generally Michael J. Bazlyer, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. 
PA. L. REV. 325 (1986). 
92 Sidney K. Smith, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Policy: Time for 
Congressional Intervention?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 743, 743–44 (2012) (“American courts 
are often the forum of choice for foreign plaintiffs, who seek to take advantage of our 
liberal pretrial discovery rules; generous jury awards; and plaintiff-friendly liability 
laws, which allow both compensatory and punitive damages. To alleviate concerns 
about hearing cases with only a tenuous connection to the chosen jurisdiction, 
American courts have primarily employed the common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. Forum non conveniens allows a court, even though it has both personal 
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy, to 
decline to exercise this jurisdiction in favor of a more appropriate forum.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
93 See Mark L. Movsesian, The Persistent Nation State and the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1083, 1085, 1088 (1996) (noting first, 
that the idea of Westphalian sovereignty minimized the power of the nation state 
and that, because sovereign states can only enact and enforce regulation in their 
sovereign borders, this allows MNCs to “relocate operations around the world with 
little trouble, remain[ing] largely beyond the reach of state regulators”). 
94 Id. 
95 Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 27, 29–30 (2010) (“Westphalia’s sovereignty principle has several 
components. First, states are formally equal. Each sovereign is the highest authority 
in its own jurisdiction, unable to judge other sovereigns, and, thus, is obligated to 
deal with other sovereigns as equals. . . . [Second,] [e]ach state is free to choose its 
own mode of governance, and that choice is entitled to respect and noninterference 
from other states. Third, states are the primary actors in the international system, 
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explained in Kiobel, this principle extends to courts of law, noting 
that the American legal system must refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction over foreign actors and events so as to not “imply 
that other nations . . . could hale our citizens into their courts for 
alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the United 
States, or anywhere else in the world.”96  This principle “guards 
against our courts triggering such serious foreign policy 
consequences.”97  Thus, since national courts are branches of 
government whose formal acts can trigger international 
conflict,98 they generally decline to hear matters involving the 
sovereignty and acts of other nations despite the harsh 
consequences that it may produce.99 
This landscape is the result of public laws and forums, 
referring only to those rights and obligations derived from 
governmental bodies.  Private laws and venues offer an 
alternative, contract-based source of authority, which has yet to 
be associated with human rights enforcement, presumably due to 
arbitration’s embattled reputation.100  But now several 
international agreements seek to use private dispute resolution 
as a mean to redress human right violations—and they seem to 
be doing so with actual success.  So, in light of popular beliefs  
 
and it is on their consent that international order rests. These principles formed the 
basis of the international political, economic, and legal system for the subsequent 
three centuries.”). 
96 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
97 Id. 
98 Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law 
Context, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 417, 419 (2000) (“Nation-States have been the 
foundation blocks of the international legal system since the birth of international 
law in modern time. In the exercise of their national sovereignty, States created 
international law. The validity and effectiveness of international law depends on the 
continuing consent and support of nation-States, while the protection of national 
sovereignty and independence is contingent upon an effective international legal 
system that is founded upon nation-States. In contemporary conditions, neither 
States nor international law can exist without the other.” (footnotes omitted)). 
99 Jennifer L. Czernecki, The United Nation’s Paradox: The Battle Between 
Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 391, 392–93 
(2003) (discussing that the United Nations enforced the modern idea of sovereignty 
with the primary goal of attempting to promote peace in the wake of the World 
Wars). 
100 See, e.g., Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap 
“Sophisticated Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 256–57 (2010) (finding that 
arbitration clauses tend to harm sophisticated parties as well as unsophisticated 
parties). 
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that arbitration is inconsistent with human rights enforcement, 
why might it now offer a remedy to victims in the developing 
world? 
II. THE LAW AND PROMISE OF PRIVATE JUSTICE 
This Article finds that private tribunals are better equipped 
than courts of law to redress international corporate torts, 
including human rights abuses, despite the perception that 
courts operate more fairly and equitably.101  This is because 
courts of law—by virtue of being a branch of  
government—disfavor adjudicating disputes that implicate 
foreign actors, events, and subject matters.102  The advantage of 
arbitration is that it operates independently from national 
governments and can preside over most conflicts without 
violating a state’s sovereignty.103  In fact, the reason why arbitral 
awards are rarely reviewable by courts of law is to make their 
enforcement as nonpolitical and independent from national 
governments as possible.104  This gives arbitral tribunals the 
101 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 
94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1113–14 (2011) (noting that arbitration is derived from, and 
created by, contract, which gives the drafters of binding arbitration clauses the 
opportunity to contractually design their arbitral forums, oftentimes lacking 
procedural safeguards on par with courts of law); Charles W. Tyler, Note, 
Lawmaking in the Shadow of the Bargain: Contract Procedure as a Second-Best 
Alternative to Mandatory Arbitration, 122 YALE L.J. 1560, 1572, 1589–90 (2013) 
(noting that if courts sought to capture arbitration’s efficiency by limiting procedural 
safeguards, courts would likely be unable to render fair and balanced decisions). See 
generally Daniel Rainer, Note, The Impact of West Tankers on Parties’ Choice of a 
Seat of Arbitration, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 431 (2010) (outlining the dynamics of 
arbitration agreements, specifically international arbitration). 
102 Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 37 F. Supp. 3d 381, 402–03 (D.D.C. 2014), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 14-7082, 2016 WL 363365 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 2016). 
103 SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 15 (1996); see also Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making 
in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3 n.4, 7, 17 (2006) 
(recounting theories of private law’s apolitical nature, though providing a 
counterpoint). 
104 Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From “Dealing in Virtue” to “Profiting 
from Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Statification” of Investment Dispute 
Settlement, 55 HARVARD INT’L L.J. ONLINE 45, 48 (2014), http://www.harvardilj.org/ 
2014/01/online_volume-55_brower_blanchard/ (“States created the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) and committed to other 
neutral arbitration fora for resolving foreign investment disputes precisely to 
remove such disputes from earlier politicized means of settlement, such as 
international diplomacy and potentially volatile domestic processes . . . .”); see also 
Charity L. Goodman, Comment, Unchartered Waters: Financial Crisis and 
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means to assert jurisdiction over international corporate torts 
without raising the practical and political dangers associated 
with public entities.  In turn, arbitration is likely a superior 
forum to try human rights cases. 
But despite arbitration’s advantages, most observers 
perceive—for very good reasons—that private forums 
overwhelmingly favor MNCs to the detriment of less 
sophisticated individuals, including human rights  
victims.105  Critics point out that arbitration rarely gives private 
citizens legal standing to assert human rights claims or even 
considers human rights relevant to a hearing.106  It thus matters 
little whether arbitration can conceivably promote human rights 
if the historical record suggests otherwise.  So, in light of 
arbitration’s theoretical advantages yet practical limitations, 
why is it now likely to emerge as a tool for human rights?  The 
following sheds light on this issue by examining the manner in 
which both the American and international forms of arbitration 
interplay with human rights. 
A. The Flawed Nature of American Arbitration 
Arbitration in the United States is much maligned.107  As 
background, arbitral jurisdiction is ostensibly grounded in 
consent.108  While injured parties have a right to pursue legal 
remedies in a court of law upon a colorable legal claim,109 access 
Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 449, 468–69 
(2007) (explaining that parties almost always voluntarily comply with arbitration 
awards due to overwhelming political considerations). 
105 See Kevin Short, 5 Reasons American Companies Refused To Sign 
Bangladesh Safety Accord, HUFFINGTON POST, (July 11, 2013, 5:36 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/11/rival-bangladesh-factory-safety-plans_n_ 
3574260.html (noting that several major American companies have, so far, refused 
to sign the Accord because of its binding arbitration process and its ability to 
actually compel payment of damages). 
106 See, e.g., Peterson & Gray, supra note 19, at 18. 
107 See Forced Arbitration Rogues Gallery, Expose Corporations That Are 
Rigging the Justice System Against Consumers, PUBLIC CITIZEN, 
http://www.citizen.org/forced-arbitration-rogues-gallery (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) 
(presenting a variety of specific arbitration clauses used by large companies that, 
arguably, limit consumer justice). See generally Raymond, supra note 17 (discussing 
the problems of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts). 
108 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contracting for State Intervention: The Origins 
of Sovereign Debt Arbitration, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 335, 335–36 (2010). 
109 See generally Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing 
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169 (2012). 
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can be limited by contract.110  For instance, disputing parties may 
either arbitrate a ripe dispute or agree ex ante to send later 
arising conflicts to private dispute resolution.111  Subsequent 
arbitral rulings are presumptively enforceable and unreviewable 
by courts of law.112  In fact, these decisions are rarely reviewable 
by anyone, considering that most arbitral hearings are conducted 
in private, produce few written opinions, and leave sparse clues 
about the methods used to reach a decision.113 
 
 
110 See Laura K. Bailey, Note, The Demise of Arbitration Agreements in Long-
Term Care Contracts, 75 MO. L. REV. 181, 188 (2010) (“Since an arbitration provision 
is part of a contract, typical contract principles govern the agreement, and a person 
cannot be compelled to arbitrate unless he has consented to do so.”). 
111 See Ashley M. Sergeant, Comment, The Corporation’s New Lethal Weapon: 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses, 57 S.D. L. REV. 149, 163 (2012) (mentioning 
that parties can choose to arbitrate either before or after a conflict arises). 
112 Only very limited circumstances allow a U.S. court to review an award, much 
less upset an arbitral award: 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the 
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the 
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—(1) where the 
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there 
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone 
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence 
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made. 
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 
(2008) (“Under the terms of § 9, a court ‘must’ confirm an arbitration award ‘unless’ 
it is vacated, modified, or corrected ‘as prescribed’ in §§ 10 and 11. Section 10 lists 
grounds for vacating an award, while § 11 names those for modifying or correcting 
one.”); see also Alan N. Resnick, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in 
Bankruptcy, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 183, 189 (2007) (“Once an arbitration 
process is concluded, courts will almost always enter an order confirming the award 
rendered by the panel and ordinarily do not review the merits of the decision.”). 
113 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create 
Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1138 (2012) (finding that little is known about how 
arbitrators reach their decisions, as opposed to how they validate their decisions, 
considering that arbitrators are not bound to legal precedent) (“[I]t is equally fair to 
wonder why [arbitral] activities—so like judges in one sense—should be effectively 
immune from judicial review.”); see also Raymond, supra note 17, at 667 
(“Businesses are accused of using arbitration as a private dispute resolution system 
that shields their transgressions from public scrutiny . . . .”). 
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For these reasons, American courts historically disfavored 
enforcing binding arbitration clauses; that was until Congress, 
noting arbitration’s efficiency,114 enacted the Federal Arbitration 
Act of 1925 (“FAA”), requiring the strict enforcement of 
contractual arbitration clauses.115  Although the FAA was 
initially interpreted as pertaining only to the federal courts,116 
Southland Corp. v. Keating117 expanded the FAA’s scope sixty 
years later.  In Keating, the Supreme Court ruled that the FAA 
preempts state law, stripping both state courts as well as federal 
venues of discretion to invalidate troublesome arbitration 
clauses.118  Then, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,119 
114 See Miles B. Farmer, Note, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of 
Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2348 (2012) (“Mandatory arbitration 
offers the potential for a faster and less costly means of dispute resolution. It holds 
out the promise of a process that is more efficient and accessible for plaintiffs . . . .”); 
see also Darrick M. Mix, Note, ADR in the Construction Industry: Continuing the 
Development of a More Efficient Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 463, 476 (1997) (discussing the efficiency of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms in the construction industry and noting that it is “quick and 
efficient”). 
115 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307. 
116 See Ramona L. Lampley, The Price of Justice: An Analysis of the Costs That 
Are Appropriately Considered in a Cost-based Vindication of Statutory Rights 
Defense to an Arbitration Agreement, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 832 (2013) (“The FAA 
declares that all ‘contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle 
by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ As 
courts have echoed since its enactment in 1925, the FAA was passed ‘in response to 
widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.’ Thus, it reflects Congress’s 
‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.’ ” (alterations in original) (footnotes 
omitted)); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the 
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury 
Trial, Separation of Powers and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 22–23 
(1997) (stating that “[t]he FAA provides that arbitration clauses may be voided ‘upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,’ ” 
implicating defenses such as unconscionability). 
117 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
118 The Court found that the legislative record suggests Congress intended the 
FAA to control more than arbitration disputes in federal courts. Because Congress 
likely meant to include state courts into the FAA’s scope, the FAA displaces state 
law. Id. at 13, 21 (“We should not refuse to exercise independent judgment 
concerning the conditions under which an arbitration agreement, generally 
enforceable under the Act, can be held invalid as contrary to public policy simply 
because the source of the substantive law to which the arbitration agreement 
attaches is a State rather than the Federal Government. I find no evidence that 
Congress intended such a double standard to apply, and I would not lightly impute 
such an intent to the 1925 Congress which enacted the Arbitration Act.”). 
119 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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the Supreme Court reviewed judicially created carve outs that 
exempted certain industries and subject matters from the FAA’s 
scope.120  Employment contracts, for example, traditionally 
received greater scrutiny due to the power imbalances underlying 
most employment relationships.121  However, the Court ruled 
that unless Congress has used express language to immunize a 
specific industry or contract type,122 courts lack authority to carve 
out subject matters from the FAA.123  As a result, nearly all 
binding arbitration clauses today are strictly enforced. 
This landscape began to draw ire soon after it became 
apparent that arbitration lacks safeguards on par with public 
venues.124  These criticisms grew louder in the 1990s when 
companies sought to reduce litigation costs using particularly 
skewed forms of arbitration.125  For example, most arbitral 
tribunals operate confidentially, free to stray from legal 
precedent and rules of law.126  And because arbitration is derived 
from contract, resourceful litigants can design the process to omit 
rules of evidence, discovery, and other standards of procedural 
120 See Imre Stephen Szalai, More Than Class Action Killers: The Impact of 
Concepcion and American Express on Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 31, 40 (2014) (stating that certain states carved out, for instance, 
employment contracts from FAA enforcement). 
121 See John-Paul Motley, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in Employment 
Contracts from Gardner-Denver to Austin: The Legal Uncertainty and Why 
Employers Should Choose Not To Use Preemployment Arbitration Agreements, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 687, 692 (1998) (explaining how some courts viewed the FAA as, in 
various ways, inapplicable to employment contracts). 
122 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party 
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
123 See Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in 
the Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 15–16 (2014) (stating, for example, 
that arbitration decisions arising out of employment contracts are rarely reviewable 
by public courts despite whether the arbitrator misunderstood the law or facts). 
124 See Raymond, supra note 17, at 666–67 (discussing the procedural problems 
and lack of safeguards to create a “biased” resolution forum). 
125 See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration 
Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 955, 966 (2014) (noting that “[f]ranchise lawyers were among the very first to 
recognize that an arbitration clause could reduce their clients’ risks of facing class 
actions,” prompting a host of later litigation including Concepcion and Amex). 
126 Comsti, supra note 123, at 10 (mentioning that arbitration is often conducted 
in private); see also Weidemaier, supra note 113, at 1092–93 (discussing the use and 
creation of precedent in arbitral rulings, noting that it does not create precedent and 
courts are free to ignore it). 
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fairness.127  Accordingly, companies insert binding arbitration 
clauses into employment, consumer, and other contracts of 
adhesion,128 limiting relief options available to those with little 
exposure to, or knowledge of, the judicial process—much less 
arbitration.129  Some scholars note that, since arbitration clauses 
provide corporations with the right to choose the arbitrator, 
private jurists overwhelmingly favor corporations in hopes of 
127 Comsti, supra note 123, at 9 (“Arbitral procedures frequently do not conform 
to minimum standards of fairness as guaranteed in a court of law. In forced 
arbitration, discovery is nonexistent or limited, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Evidence do not apply, and there is no right to appeal. . . . [In turn,] [f]orced 
arbitration stacks the decks . . . .”). Professor Comsti explains that arbitration varies 
from public forums because litigants—and businesses in particular—may exploit the 
lack of procedural and fairness safeguards and protect company reputations by 
litigating in a confidential, private venue. Id. at 9–10 (stating that, in the 
employment contract context, the lack of procedural and fairness safeguards in 
arbitration terms often leads to contracts substantially favoring the more powerful 
drafting party). 
128 Lost in the Fine Print, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.afj.org/ 
multimedia/first-monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print (last visited Mar. 2, 2016); 
see also Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes 
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) (“By permitting companies to use 
arbitration clauses to exempt themselves from class actions, Concepcion will provide 
companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful 
acts without fear of being sued.”). The states must follow the FAA’s lead in 
harboring a public policy favoring arbitration since the Supreme Court found that 
the FAA preempts state law. See Raymond, supra note 17, at 667 (noting that while 
arbitration can provide many advantages, it would be wise to limit the use of 
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts where they are commonly found). See 
generally David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State 
Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217 (2013) (broadly describing the FAA’s preemption of 
state law). 
129 See Jennifer Schulz, Comment, Arbitrating Arbitrability: How the U.S. 
Supreme Court Empowered the Arbitrator at the Expense of the Judge and the 
Average Joe, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1269, 1282 (2011) (“Arbitration has traditionally 
been agreed to by two knowing business entities of presumably comparable strength. 
Parties to employment and consumer contracts, however, almost always have 
unequal bargaining power. These employees and consumers are often presented 
with take-it-or-leave-it contracts of adhesion that leave little room for 
negotiation . . . .”). Schulz found that the use of arbitration provisions in consumer 
adhesion contracts produces a “one-sided” dispute resolution process, favoring the 
company. Id.; see also Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left To Remedy Wage Theft? How 
Arbitration Mandates That Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1125–26 (describing how employers often use arbitration 
clauses inserted into employment contracts to limit their employees to file suit, join 
class actions, and harness statutory rights); Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: 
Proposals for Reform of Consumer-Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 
1170–71 (2009) [hereinafter Mandatory Arbitration Clauses] (mentioning that 
companies often bind unsophisticated parties to arbitration agreements by inserting 
such clauses deftly and subtly into contracts of adhesion). 
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garnering repeat business.130  Empirical and anecdotal studies 
indicate the same:  Arbitrators who impose penalties on 
companies are rarely selected again while those favoring 
companies are used consistently.131 
Although the FAA ostensibly includes a savings clause 
allowing courts to strike down unconscionable provisions, several 
recent Supreme Court cases suggest that even deeply flawed 
arbitration clauses are unlikely to be voided.132  In AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion,133 the Court reviewed California’s public 
policy against enforcing arbitration clauses that limit a party’s 
right to join a class action lawsuit.134  The State argued that 
restricting class actions would dissuade injured parties from 
litigating small claims, encouraging companies to exploit 
unsophisticated parties when the stakes are low.135  Class action 
lawsuits resolve this problem by providing a means to combine 
claims into a single lawsuit.136 
The Supreme Court ruled, however, that courts must strictly 
enforce binding arbitration clauses, essentially reducing the 
frequency in which injured parties will seek redress from 
130 Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, supra note 129, at 1174–75 (finding that 
arbitrators who hope to receive compensation to arbitrate disputes have significant 
incentives to favor the business clients, which often choose their preferred arbitrator 
and employ them); see also Weidemaier, supra note 113, at 1138 (“What is 
undeniable . . . is that arbitrators are private actors who are chiefly accountable to 
the parties who pay their fees.”). 
131 Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, supra note 129, at 1174–75 (providing 
examples of arbitrators who lost business after finding in favor of private individuals 
over companies and citing another California study that showed 89.5% of California 
arbitrations were presided over by the same twenty-eight arbitrators and that 
companies usually win 94% of the time, suggesting that arbitrators respond to 
incentives favoring business interests). 
132 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 128 (describing how Concepcion “impedes 
access to justice”). 
133 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
134 Id. at 356–57 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
135 Id. at 340 (majority opinion) (“[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer 
contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties 
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party 
with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat 
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the 
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] 
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these 
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not 
be enforced.” (alterations in original) (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 
Cal 4th 148, 162–63 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
136 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 785 (2011). 
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companies for small claims.137  Even in American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant138—where it was established that 
certain arbitration clauses make pursuing claims economically 
irrational—the Court held that Congress overwhelming created a 
national policy favoring arbitration which only additional federal 
legislation can overcome.139  And now after Concepcion and Amex, 
it is hard to envision a clause so lopsided as to violate the FAA.140  
While international arbitration wields a stronger reputation, 
most commentators suggest that it, likewise, poorly contemplates 
human rights. 
B. International Arbitration 
Despite being procedurally superior to American arbitration, 
critics assert that international arbitration is unable to promote 
global human rights and may even render detrimental  
effects.141  As background, international arbitration emerged as a 
global imperative after World War II when foreign direct 
investment and trade began to boom.142  But despite the benefits 
of transnational commerce, the system almost collapsed under 
137 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352. See generally Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with 
Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2012). 
138 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
139 Id. at 2315–16; Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 125, at 971 (reciting that 
the plaintiffs alleged that American Express’s arbitration agreement violated 
antitrust laws and that it was economically unfeasible for individual litigants to try 
the matter). 
140 See Szalai, supra note 120, at 39–40 (asserting that courts are increasingly 
perceiving that arbitration clauses are de facto valid after Concepcion and Amex). 
141 James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: 
Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 77, 77 (2007) 
(“[C]ommentators generally agree that international investment law and arbitration 
have an adverse impact on the promotion and protection of human rights.”). 
142 Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed 
Nationalization, Rising Commodities, and “Americanization” in International 
Arbitration and the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 359, 362 (2008) (reviewing the growth of trade and investment, and the 
increase of international investment and noting that “[i]nternational commercial 
arbitration grew from the need to find a suitable dispute resolution system for 
parties in the international trade, commerce, and investment that blossomed after 
the conclusion of World War II”); see also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through 
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1524 (describing foreign 
investment as a vital tool). 
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the weight of investor anxiety.143  This is because foreign 
investors feared that host nations would nationalize their 
invested assets.144  Upon such a seizure, an investor could only 
bring suit in the host country’s court system, which rarely ruled 
in favor of alien interests.145  Thus, the historical landscape put 
investors at the practical and legal mercy of host countries.146 
This inspired a couple of international agreements which 
each sought to resolve international investment disputes better 
than courts of law.147  For example, during the mid-twentieth 
century, the World Bank enacted a regime known as the 
International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes 
(“ICSID”), governing investment disputes between host countries 
and foreign companies.148  The ICSID’s authority is derived from 
investment pacts called bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), 
which grant foreign investors a level of protection in their host 
countries.149  Upon a BIT violation, an investor and host nation 
must submit to binding arbitration, bypassing each party’s 
national court system.150  However, an additional problem arose 
since arbitral judgments do not, by themselves, compel 
payment.151  Historically, the act of fulfilling an award required a 
victorious party to seek enforcement in some place where the  
 
143 See Victor R. Salgado, Comment, The Case Against Adopting BIT Law in the 
FTAA Framework, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (providing a historical account of 
the creation of BIT law and noting that, previously, foreign investors had few 
remedies when foreign nations expropriated or nationalized an investor’s property). 
144 Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 142 (asserting that international commercial 
arbitration arose to, in part, mitigate anxiety that local courts are biased against 
foreign litigants). 
145 Id. 
146 See Salgado, supra note 143. See generally LOUIS T. WELLS & RAFIQ AHMED, 
MAKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT SAFE: PROPERY RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
(2007) (describing the insecurities of foreign investors). 
147 Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in 
Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825, 834 (2011) (discussing how ICSID awards 
have the “purported benefit of avoiding arguable bias by national courts, which 
render decisions against co-equal branches of their own national governments”). 
148 Id. at 837–38 (discussing how the ICSID was originated in 1965 by the World 
Bank but came into prominence in 1978 when the convention was expanded to cover 
more disputes and provide fact finding). 
149 See Born, supra note 90, at 831–32. 
150 Id. 
151 See Kate M. Supnik, Note, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention 
To Reconcile Competing Interests in International Investment Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 
343, 354–55 (2009). 
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loser held assets.  But, as before, local courts tend to treat foreign 
parties with hostility, refusing to honor awards against their own 
or allies’ property.152 
A critical solution was pioneered by the ICSID153 and the 
United Nations’ Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards154 (“New York Convention”), which cleverly 
sought to strip national courts of discretion to review arbitral 
judgment.155  For example, ICSID awards can only be overruled 
by the ICSID’s review panel upon finding that the issuing 
tribunal violated certain limited procedural safeguards.156  
Likewise, the New York Convention—which governs the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards—requires signatory 
states to honor foreign awards with the same respect given to 
“domestic sister-state judgment[s].”157  This means that enforcing 
parties are entitled to payment in any country that has ratified 
the New York Convention.158  Honoring states have little 
authority to review an award’s merits even despite most errors of 
fact or law.159  In fact, nearly all member states blindly adhere to 
152 In the case that a losing party refuses to honor a judgment, the victorious 
party must seek enforcement using an authority located where the loser possessed 
property. Id. at 344; see also Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 142 (explaining the 
arbitral process created to alleviate the fears derived from hometown litigation). 
153 See Michael H. Strub Jr., Note, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards Under Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the New York Convention: A Proposal 
for Effective Guidelines, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1034–35 (1990) (describing the 
situation whereby a party wins an arbitral award but must then find a means to 
enforce it); see also Anoosha Boralessa, Enforcement in the United States and United 
Kingdom of ICSID Awards Against the Republic of Argentina: Obstacles That 
Transnational Corporations May Face, 17 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 53, 54 (2004); Born, 
supra note 90, at 837. 
154 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and 
International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 95 (2000) 
(describing the New York Convention as the most important pact enforcing arbitral 
agreements). 
155 See Strub, supra note 153, at 1031–32 (noting that the New York Convention 
is paramount to promoting an effective international arbitration system). 
156 Franck, supra note 142, at 1547. 
157 Strub, supra note 152, at 1041–42. 
158 See Goodman, supra note 104, at 468–69 (explaining in the ICSID context 
that for legal and political reasons, arbitration awards are almost always 
enforceable because claimants have neither the right to seek appellate review in a 
national court nor do they have the ability to, ex ante, remove the dispute to a court 
of law). 
159 See Drahozal, supra note 154, at 104 (“In countries that are party to the New 
York Convention, the arbitral situs, and no other country, can vacate an arbitration 
award.”); Franck, supra note 141, at 1555. 
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the New York Convention, as the system’s efficacy is almost 
universally beneficial while contravening the convention is 
tantamount to a treaty violation.160  And because nearly every 
country has adopted the New York Convention,161 including the 
United States,162 arbitral awards are generally enforceable 
without disruption.163  The result is a system structured by 
sophisticated parties to resolve disputes more fairly than local 
courts in contrast to domestic arbitration.164 
However international arbitration’s ability to redress human 
rights violations appears limited despite its structural 
advantages.165  Recall that arbitration must have consent to hear 
a dispute—and once a forum’s jurisdiction is established, it may 
only rule on issues to which the parties have agreed.166  A MNC is 
thus unlikely to ratify a human rights agreement authorizing 
and consenting to arbitration; otherwise, the threat of liability 
would be established where none currently exists.  For example, 
160 See S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing 
Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory Interpretation in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 521 (2013) (“Although contemporary commentary 
often overlooks the public international law attributes of international commercial 
arbitration, several international authorities have nevertheless indicated that the 
New York Convention should be interpreted ‘in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation of international law, which are codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.’ ”). 
161 Strub, supra note 153, at 1031–32. 
162 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
163 See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co., v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas 
Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that courts have few 
avenues through which they may overrule an arbitral award) (“Under Article V(1)(d) 
of the New York Convention, a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award if 
‘[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.’ ”). 
164 Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 142 (“Accordingly, the desire of each party to 
avoid having a dispute determined by a foreign judicial forum fueled the growth of 
international commercial arbitration.”). 
165 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 
60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 579 & n.25 (2011) (noting that the “present architecture” 
of international investment arbitration is improperly situated to handle human 
rights considerations). 
166 Ursula Kriebaum, Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface Between 
International Investment Protection and Human Rights, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 165, 187 (A. 
Reinisch & U. Kriebaum eds., 2007) (“Investment tribunals will not be able to hear 
direct claims of violations of human rights. They must usually restrict themselves to 
considering allegations of violations of the instruments over which they have 
jurisdiction.”). 
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the primary reason why MNCs favor signing international 
investment treaties is because they protect MNC assets while 
neither providing individuals with standing to arbitrate nor 
creating a duty to observe human rights.167  This caused the 
tribunal in Biloune v. Ghana Investments Centre168 to express 
regret, remarking that “all individuals, regardless of nationality, 
are entitled to fundamental human rights . . . . [But] it does not 
follow that this . . . [t]ribunal is authorized to deal with 
allegations of violations of fundamental human rights.”169 
Therefore, on the one hand, the efficient manner by which 
international arbitration resolves investment and commercial 
conflicts suggests the process is applicable to human rights 
enforcement.  This seems especially possible considering 
arbitration’s ability to overcome most of the political dangers 
associated with courts of law.  On the other hand, it also seems 
that, not only has international arbitration failed to benefit 
human rights victims, but it also might actually encourage 
MNCs to commit global atrocities.170  Overcoming this hurdle is 
what makes recent enactments of certain international 
agreements so innovative. 
167 Jernej Letnar Cernic, Corporate Human Rights Violations Under 
Stabilization Clauses, 11 GERMAN L.J. 210, 225 (2010) (explaining that MNCs enjoy 
provisions in their agreements and BITs allowing them to bring claims against their 
host countries, yet “no international mechanism exists where individuals could bring 
complaints against investors”); Peterson & Gray, supra note 19 (mentioning that 
BITs do not provide a right for individuals to bring MNCs to arbitration). 
168 UNCITRAL Arb. (Oct. 27, 1989). 
169 Id.; Luke Eric Peterson, Selected Recent Developments in IIA Arbitration and 
Human Rights, IIA MONITOR NO. 2 1, 2 (2009) (“[H]uman rights issues have been 
relatively slow to arise in the [international investment] arbitration context. Indeed, 
IIAs themselves are generally silent with respect to human rights matters, and do 
not expressly reference human rights-related obligations of States, much less seek to 
introduce any new human rights duties or obligations for governments or 
investors.”). 
170 Peterson & Gray, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that there are “no known” 
instances where arbitration has been used to promote human rights); see also 
Peterson, supra note 169, at 12 (“[A]t least to date, there have been no awards which 
address [human rights] to a meaningful degree.”). 
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III. THE REALITY AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 
Despite the perception that international arbitration is 
inconsistent with human rights litigation,171 this landscape is 
radically changing.  In the last decade, a handful of international 
agreements have sought to include both binding arbitration and 
human rights terms, suggesting that such an arrangement could 
be successful.  This development went largely unnoticed because 
the first generation of agreements incorporated human rights 
symbolically with sparse practical or legal effect.  But then, in 
2014, a number of international agreements began employing 
binding arbitration clauses with—for the very first time—the 
legal capacity to sanction MNCs for transgressing human rights.  
These agreements’ early success inspired segments of the 
international community, including the United Nations, the 
International Olympic Committee, and the International Labor 
Organization, to employ, or consider using, similar arbitration 
clauses.  This, indeed, was never before thought possible. 
A. The Recent History of Arbitration in International Contracts 
and Agreements 
One of the first agreements to incorporate human rights and 
arbitration was ratified nearly a half century ago by a collection 
of African nations, forming the Organization of African Unity 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa172 (“African Refugee Agreement”).  But since the African 
Refugee Agreement binds only sovereign states, not MNCs or 
individuals, it lacks the authority to regulate corporate behavior.  
Similarly, in 1973, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons 
Including Diplomatic Agents was enacted, suffering from the 
same limitations as the African Refugee Agreement, unable to  
 
 
171 Peterson & Gray, supra note 19, at 33 (finding that no international arbitral 
tribunals have ever found in a way that enforces human rights concerns). 
172 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa, art. IX, Sept. 10, 1969, U.N.T.S. 14691. 
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subject corporations to its binding arbitration provision.173  These 
agreements foreshadowed the use of arbitration in today’s more 
socially conscious international agreements. 
In 2003, Singapore and a small European conglomerate,  
comprised of Ireland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, 
enacted the EFTA-Singapore Free Trade Agreement174 (“EFTA-
Singapore Agreement”).  The EFTA-Singapore Agreement is an 
investment treaty creating certain obligations among its 
signatory countries as host nations and their national companies 
as investors.  Since the agreement is an international investment 
treaty, its arbitration clause extends beyond the pact’s signatory 
countries, binding the investor corporations pursuant to the 
ICSID.175  The novelty of the agreement is found in the preamble, 
which affirms each party’s commitment to human rights.  But, in 
addition to most preambles being legally benign, the probability 
that a global atrocity will arise out of trade between, for example, 
Lichtenstein and Singapore is quite low.  While the EFTA-
Singapore Agreement creates a relationship between investment 
and human rights, the arbitral mechanism is unlikely to sanction 
conduct or amend corporate behavior.  Instead the human rights 
clause is symbolic, publicly suggesting a means for future 
agreements to enforce global standards using private forums.  In 
a similar fashion, the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement’s 
preamble affirms a commitment to human rights, including in 
the greater agreement a binding arbitration provision, though 
the pact also governs only investment disputes, excluding human 
rights violations from the scope of the enforcement process.176  
While these international agreements importantly suggest that 
arbitration is consistent with human rights enforcement, an 
actual accord employing arbitration in a manner altering 
behavior and sanctioning corporate conduct would not be enacted 
until 2014. 
173 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, art. 13, Dec. 14, 
1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. 
174 Free Trade Agreement, EFTA-Sing., June 26, 2002, http://wits.world 
bank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/EFTA-Singapore.pdf. 
175 Id. art. 48. 
176 See Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Colom., pmbl., ch. 21, Nov. 21, 2008, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colom 
bia-colombie/can-colombia-toc-tdm-can-colombie.aspx?lang=eng. 
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B. International Arbitration and Human Rights Since 2014 
Importantly, several international organizations have 
ratified, or are considering, agreements using arbitration to 
promote corporate standards of human rights.  As background, 
the promise of arbitration as a human rights tool is largely 
attributable to western universities, which have long sought for a 
means to regulate the apparel industry.177  In the early 1990s, 
media reports publicized working conditions in international 
garment factories, otherwise known as “sweatshops.”178  It soon 
became apparent that an area in which universities wielded 
leverage over the clothing industry was in the business of  
school-licensed apparel.179  Since apparel companies need 
universities more than the schools rely upon any one 
manufacturer, several institutions began contractually requiring 
their apparel partners to use only factories abiding by certain 
labor standards.180  But despite subsequent lawsuits—including 
the University of Wisconsin’s action alleging that Adidas 
manufactured school apparel with substandard Indonesian 
factories181—the abuses continued. 
The watershed moment occurred after a series of fires 
destroyed garment factories in Bangladesh, one of which alone 
killed over a thousand workers.182  Compounding the tragedy was 
Bangladesh’s lack of tort law, preventing victims from seeking a 
177 See, e.g., Michelle Gillingham, Diag Protestors Target Sweatshop, MICH. 
DAILY (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.michigandaily.com/news/group-advocating-
against-sweat-shops-protests-diag. For instance, a popular university group at over 
150 colleges and universities is the United Students Against Sweatshops. UNITED 
STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS, http://usas.org/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
178 See, e.g., Gillingham, supra note 177. 
179 See Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams 2013: Texas 
Longhorns Can’t Be Stopped, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/12/18/college-footballs-most-valuable-
teams-2013-texas-longhorns-cant-be-stopped/ (noting that the University of Texas’s 
team alone is worth $139 million). 
180 See Sarah Blaskey & Phil Gasper, Campus Struggles Against Sweatshops 
Continue, DOLLARS & SENSE http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2012/ 
0912blaskeygasper.html (last updated Dec. 2012). 
181 Complaint at 3–4, Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Adidas Am., Inc. 
(Wis. Cir. Apr. 10, 2013) (No. 12CV2775). 
182 See generally U.S. Clothing Retailers Adopt Factory Safety Plan for 
Bangladesh, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 918 (2013); Jim Yardley, Justice Still Elusive in 
Factory Disasters in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2013, at A1. 
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legal remedy;183 due to sovereignty issues, national and 
international authorities were unable to establish jurisdiction, 
largely shielding western apparel companies from liability.184  
However, the ensuing publicity inspired the Bangladesh Accord 
on Fire and Building Safety (“Bangladesh Accord”), which most 
apparel companies ratified in October 2013 out of fear of losing 
university business.185  The Bangladesh Accord currently 
obligates western apparel companies to improve factory 
standards186 as well as repair high-risk dangers at potentially 
sizeable costs.187 
The Bangladesh Accord’s key innovation lies in its dispute 
resolution process.188  Initial conflicts are settled by the 
Bangladesh Accord’s “Steering Committee,” appeals of which are 
submitted to binding arbitration.189  Considering that national 
183 See generally MAHMUDUL MURSALIN, APPLICATION OF TORT LAW IN 
BANGLADESH: PROSPECTS & CHALLENGES (2014) (explaining the complete lack of 
tort law in Bangladesh). 
184 See Naima Farrell, Note, Accountability for Outsourced Torts: Expanding 
Brands’ Duty of Care for Workplace Harms Committed Abroad, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
1491, 1499 (2013) (“[C]ontracted workers likely cannot enforce existing labor 
standards in their home-states through litigation. First, the workers may have 
difficulty bringing the foreign brand to court in the workers’ home jurisdiction. 
Second, the workers’ direct employer—the supplier—may be judgment-proof, 
meaning that satisfaction of a judgment against the employer in the workers’ home-
state courts would be difficult or impossible . . . .”). 
185 See, e.g., Cornell University Severs Business Ties with JanSport, CORNELL 
CHRON. (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/2014/10/cornell-
university-severs-business-ties-jansport. 
186 BANGLADESH ACCORD, supra note 16, at 1–2 (“The agreement covers all 
suppliers producing products for the signatory companies. The signatories shall 
designate these suppliers as falling into the following categories, according to which 
they shall require these supplier to accept inspections and implement remediation 
measures in their factories according to the following breakdown: 1. Safety 
inspections, remediation and fire safety training at facilities representing, in the 
aggregate, not less than 30%, approximately, of each signatory company’s annual 
production in Bangladesh by volume (“Tier 1 factories”). 2. Inspection and 
remediation at any remaining major or long-term suppliers to each company (“Tier 2 
factories”). Together, Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories shall represent not less than 65%, 
approximately, of each signatory company’s production in Bangladesh by volume. 
3. Limited initial inspections to identify high risks at facilities . . . .”). 
187 Id. 
188 Skype Interview with Rob Wayss, Executive Director of Bangladesh 
Operations (Feb. 12, 2015) (on file with author). 
189 BANGLADESH ACCORD, supra note 16 (“Any dispute between the parties to, 
and arising under, the terms of this Agreement shall first be presented to and 
decided by the [Steering Committee], which shall decide the dispute by majority vote 
of the [Steering Committee] within a maximum of 21 days of a petition being filed by 
one of the parties. Upon request of either party, the decision of the [Steering 
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courts are unable to review arbitral judgments pursuant to the 
New York Convention, awards arising out of Bangladesh Accord 
violations are globally enforceable.190  And since the Bangladesh 
Accord prevents companies from shielding themselves behind the 
international supply chain, as it expressly binds companies to the 
acts of “all suppliers producing products,”191 the Bangladesh 
Accord offers the first effective method to hold corporations liable 
for torts and other acts in the developing world.192  The efficacy of 
the Bangladesh Accord is inferable from how several apparel 
companies reluctantly signed it,193 some of which, such as the 
Gap, advocated for an alternative, substantially similar 
resolution that conspicuously lacked an arbitration  
clause.194  Considering the large-scale adherence to the 
Bangladesh Accord, this agreement appears to mark the first 
instance in which arbitration is altering corporate behavior for 
the sake of human rights.195  It, thus, seems possible that the  
 
Committee] may be appealed to a final and binding arbitration process. . . . The 
process for binding arbitration, including, but not limited to, the allocation of costs 
relating to any arbitration and the process for selection of the Arbitrator, shall be 
governed by the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
1985 (with amendments as adopted in 2006).”). 
190 Id. (“Any arbitration award shall be enforceable in a court of law of the 
domicile of the signatory against whom enforcement is sought and shall be subject 
to . . . The New York Convention.”); see Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a 
Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: 
Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online Consumer 
Arbitration, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 51 (2002) (stating that courts have “limited” 
abilities to review an arbitral award’s merits under the New York Convention). 
191 BANGLADESH ACCORD, supra note 16, at 1. 
192 See Telephone Interview with Robert C. Thompson, Former Partner, 
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae (Feb. 27, 2015) (on file with author) (noting that 
possibly the most difficult hurdle to enacting an effective corporate human rights 
regime is overcoming the global supply chain whereby corporations have limited 
liability for acts committed by subsidiaries and contracted companies). 
193 See Steven Greenhouse, Major Retailers Join Bangladesh Safety Plan, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/business/global/hm-
agrees-to-bangladesh-safety-plan.html?_r=0 (“Gap has resisted signing on, objecting 
to its legally binding nature and saying it was already doing a lot on its own, having 
hired a fire inspector and promised $22 million in loans for factory improvements.”). 
194 See Brad Plumer, U.S. Retailers Aren’t Signing a New Safety Agreement for 
Bangladesh. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (May 16, 2013), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/16/u-s-retailers-arent-signing-a-new-safety-acco 
rd-for-bangladesh-heres-why/. 
195 Skype Interview with Rob Wayss, supra note 188 (remarking that the 
Bangladesh Accord has experienced no problems with the willingness of apparel 
companies to comply with the agreement). 
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Bangladesh Accord’s value extends beyond Bengali laborers, 
serving as a powerful example for other industries rife with 
human rights abuses. 
Indeed, the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) soon 
followed suit, partly due to criticisms directed at the IOC for 
human rights violations allegedly committed by host nations and 
MNCs contracted to operate past Olympic Games.196  For 
instance, media coverage publicized anti-LGBT laws enacted by 
the Russian government in the months preceding the Sochi 
Olympics.197  Accusations also targeted MNCs for possibly 
violating the rights of low-skilled labor.198  In 2014, the IOC 
responded by declaring that all future Olympic host city 
contracts would include provisions obligating signatories to 
uphold human rights.199  Jurisdiction to hear such disputes is 
vested in the Court of Arbitration for Sport, bypassing national 
courts.200  Naturally then, any award rendered by this arbitral 
196 See, e.g., Hanna Kozlowska, An Appalling List of Human Rights Abuses Last 
Year in Putin’s Russia, QUARTZ (Jan. 30, 2015), http://qz.com/336047/an-appalling-
list-of-human-rights-abuses-last-year-in-putins-russia/ (“Hundreds of people 
participating in peaceful protests during the Sochi Winter Olympics and after 
Russia’s occupation of Crimea were arrested. You can now get up to 15 years in 
prison for ‘mass rioting.’ Authorities also ‘harassed and intimidated organizations, 
individuals, and journalists’ in the run-up to the Sochi Olympics, and mistreated the 
families evicted to make way for the Olympic facilities.”); Russia’s Olympian Abuses, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/russias-olympian-abuses. 
197 See Owen Gibson & Shaun Walker, Olympians Urge Russia To Reconsider 
‘Gay Propaganda’ Laws, GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
sport/2014/jan/30/olympic-athletes-russia-repeal-anti-gay-laws. 
198 Russia: Migrant Olympic Workers Cheated, Exploited, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/06/russia-migrant-olympic-workers-
cheated-exploited (“In several cases documented by Human Rights Watch, 
employers retaliated against foreign migrant workers who protested abuses by 
denouncing them to the authorities, resulting in the workers’ expulsion from Russia. 
Cases like this highlight the vulnerable situation for migrant workers in Russia, 
particularly those without contracts to document their employment . . . .”); see Max 
Strasser, Corporate Sponsors Faulted for Sochi Participation, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 
31, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/31/olympics-spon 
sorsfaultedforgoingtosochi.html. 
199 Olympics: Host City Contracts Will Include Rights Protections, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/22/olympics-host-city-
contracts-will-include-rights-protections. 
200 INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER 105 (2015) By 
implication, IOC contract disputes are resolved by international arbitration: “Any 
dispute arising on the occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic Games shall be 
submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in accordance with the 
Code of Sports-Related Arbitration.” Id.; see also Ryan Gauthier, The New Olympic 
Host City Contract: Human Rights à la Carte?, ASSER INT’L SPORTS L. BLOG  
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body would be redeemable worldwide pursuant to the New York 
Convention.  Thus, similarly to the Bangladesh Accord, the 
emergence of political fortitude, combined with the efficacy of 
international arbitration, produced a legally enforceable human 
rights instrument able to bind MNCs. 
Perhaps the most significant development concerns the 
willingness of the United Nations to consider human rights 
proposals potentially modeled after the Bangladesh Accord.  In 
December 2014, the U.N.’s Business and Human Rights Forum 
first heard details of a potential international agreement using 
international arbitration as a means to bind MNCs to global 
codes of conduct.201  The proposal established that the U.N.’s 
Guiding Principles on human rights could serve as the governing 
standard by which MNCs must abide.202  Notably, the panel also 
asserted that MNCs might favor such an agreement, considering 
the growing demands for improved corporate behavior.203  The 
recent popularity of public benefit corporations, in addition to 
several more traditional companies, which have made social 
consciousness a corporate objective,204 suggests as much.205  Some 
observers assert that a number of MNCs endeavor to improve 
global conditions but harbor fears of becoming competitively 
disadvantaged relative to those transgressing human rights.206  
(Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-new-olympic-host-city-
contract-human-rights-a-la-carte-by-ryan-gauthier-phd-researcher-erasmus-universi 
ty-rotterdam. 
201 Claes Cronstedt, Remarks on the Int’l Arb. Tribunal on Bus. & Hum. Rts. 
(Sept. 29, 2014). 
202 Id.  
203 See Claes Cronstedt et al., An International Arbitration Tribunal on Business 
& Human Rights—Enhancing Access to Remedy 10 (Bus. & Hum. Rts. Resource 
Centre, Working Paper No. 4, 2014) (suggesting that companies often respond to 
consumer bases that advocate for socially responsible corporate behaviors, that it 
may be necessary for certain companies to ratify meaningful human rights 
agreements, and that since some companies lose business to those companies 
transgressing human rights, such an agreement would reduce this competitive 
advantage). 
204 See, e.g., Oliberte’s Factory in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: The World’s First Fair 
Trade Certified Footwear Manufacturing Factory, OLIBERTE, http://www.olib 
erte.com/pages/fair-trade-certified (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (explaining that the 
company’s mission is to benefit workers in Ethiopia). 
205 See generally J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s 
Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347–49 (2014) (outlining 
the history and emergence of social enterprise and public benefit corporations). 
206 See Travis Robert-Ritter, Note, Achilles’ Heel: How the ATS and NAFTA 
Have Combined To Create Substantial Tort Liability for US Corporations Operating 
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MNCs might also enjoy a means to heal reputational damages 
levied from misdirected blame.207  Therefore, considering the 
influence of the U.N. in tandem with the emerging social 
consciousness of both corporations and international audiences, 
the possibility of such an arbitral U.N. regime is becoming 
increasingly likely. 
This Article suggests that the value of the Bangladesh 
Accord, IOC contracts, and other prior agreements are 
monumental since they offer powerful examples of how 
arbitration can be used to bind corporations to human rights.  In 
fact, these international agreements strongly suggest that this 
trend is taking force.  In light of the rapid emergence of socially 
conscious businesses and consumer bases,208 other industries 
harboring the necessary political will and leverage are likely to 
advocate for a similar pact.  Indeed, this was the case in the 
apparel industry landscape, where contempt for sweatshops and 
the buying power of universities pushed apparel leaders to abide 
by standards of conduct enforced by the New York Convention.  
Now, it seems that the international community is likewise 
responding by proposing a variety of means to promote human 
rights with arbitration. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ARBITRATION 
There are numerous means by which such an arbitral 
mechanism could be inserted into future contracts and 
agreements.  Considering the recent growth of arbitration in 
human rights litigation, as well as its unfulfilled potential, this 
relationship may become the preferred method to promote 
socially responsible corporate behavior.  However, there are also 
a number of obstacles suggesting that the merging of arbitration  
 
 
in Mexico, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 443, 444 (2011) (remarking that enforcing 
labor and environmental laws, for example, puts developing nations at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to countries that refuse to enforce such regulations). 
207 Cronstedt, supra note 201.  
208 See generally J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: 
Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6–14 (2011) (describing the rise 
of the public benefit corporation, which incorporates the dual objectives of creating 
profit for shareholders as well as achieving a public benefit that is oftentimes 
charitable in nature). 
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and human rights could face tension.  The following discussion 
forecasts the future of human rights litigations, investigating 
possible applications as well as obstacles to implementation. 
A. Possible Future Applications 
The most promising mediums to promote human rights 
include BITs and other similar investment treaties;209 this is 
because, pursuant to ICSID, jurisdiction over investment 
disputes already belongs to international arbitration.210  More 
importantly, since sovereign nations ratify BITs, their consent 
effectively binds investor corporations without requiring MNCs 
to also assent.211  This means that new BITs could be drafted, or 
current ones modified, to include human rights and arbitral 
terms.  Already, ICSID panels have relied upon, and considered, 
human rights decisions from venues such as the European Court 
of Human Rights, but have lacked authority to hear allegations 
that an investor company violated human rights due to a lack of 
operative BIT language.212  The key then is that the more 
influential nations must agree to only BITs with human rights 
clauses as a matter of course to initiate an international trend.  
This seems especially possible in light of certain BITs, including 
the EFTA-Singapore and Canada-Colombia free trade 
agreements, which already have symbolically incorporated such 
provisions.213 
In fact, it appears that the necessary political will needed to 
interject human rights into commercial treaties is mounting.214  
For example, the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), which is the current framework 
promoting international trade, uses a particularly respected form 
209 See, e.g., Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, How To Impose 
Human Rights Obligations on Corporations Under Investment Treaties? Pragmatic 
Guidelines for the Amendment of BITs, in Y.B. ON INT’L INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 570–
71, 600 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011–12) (offering a proposal regarding how to include 
human rights into BITs). 
210 Supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text. 
211 Id. 
212 Fry, supra note 141, at 84 (noting the long history of human rights in 
investor arbitration and that “[a]nother clear case of such reliance on human rights 
jurisprudence is the [ICSID] tribunal in Técnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. Mexico”). 
213 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, EFTA-Sing., supra note 174. 
214 See, e.g., Susan L. Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State 
Arbitration, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 423, 432–33 (2013) (providing a middle group 
approach to help incorporate human rights into investor treaties). 
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of arbitration.215  The organization has received proposals to 
incorporate human rights into its general charter and also within 
the scope of its dispute resolution.216  When considering that 
Canada and other nations are already ratifying these types of 
investor treaties,217 a possibility exists that international 
commercial treaties could advance human rights using ICSID or 
UNCITRAL. 
There are also a number of areas that could, or are likely to, 
generate industry-specific agreements mimicking the Bangladesh 
Accord.  Since the primary catalyst of an effective international 
regime is a combination of outrage and buying power, the 
mineral extraction industry seems particularly amenable.  
Observers note that corporate human rights abuses are 
prominent in this field,218 producing a number of Alien Tort 
Statute disputes and other human rights conflicts.219  Perhaps 
the most infamous resource extraction dispute, Aguinda v. 
Texaco, Inc.,220 involved accusations that Texaco environmentally 
contaminated isolated Ecuadorean villages for over thirty 
215 For instance, the Bangladesh Accord expressly models its arbitration process 
after UNCITRAL’s model. BANGLADESH ACCORD, supra note 16. 
216 Julia Salasky, The New UNCITRAL Rules and Convention on Transparency, 
LSE HUM. RTS. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and-human-
rights/portfolio-items/transparency-in-investment-treaty-arbitration-and-the-un-gui 
ding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights-the-new-uncitral-rules-and-conventio 
n-on-transparency (reporting that John Ruggie, the then Special Representative of 
the U.N. Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights, spoke to UNCITRAL 
about the reasons supporting, and the manner in which, the organization could 
incorporate human rights into the regime); Meetings Coverage, General Assembly, 
Draft Transparency Convention ‘a Powerful Instrument’ in Treaty-Based Arbitration 
United Nations International Trade Law Body Tells Sixth Committee, U.N. Press 
Release GA/L/3479 (Oct. 13, 2014) (indicating, as an example, the Permanent 
Observer from the Holy See suggested that UNCITRAL should consider defining the 
rule of law by incorporating human rights into the concept). 
217 Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Colom., supra note 176, at ch. 8. 
218 See generally Gare A. Smith, An Introduction to Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Extractive Industry, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2008) 
(introducing a symposium detailing and discussing the corporate human rights 
issues that are rife in the extractive industry). 
219 Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Note, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability 
of Transnational Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 359, 362 (1999) (“[A] few Alien Tort suits have been filed against 
[MNCs], primarily in extractive industries, for torts in violation of civil and political 
rights and, in some cases, of international environmental law.”). 
220 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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years.221  Another notable case is Presbyterian Church of Sudan 
v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,222 where Sudanese villagers claimed a 
Canadian oil company conspired “to commit gross human rights 
violations, including extrajudicial killing, forcible displacement, 
war crimes, confiscation and destruction of property, kidnapping, 
rape, and enslavement” with the Sudanese government.223  
“Collectively, plaintiffs claim[ed] that these activities amount[ed] 
to genocide.”224  Likewise, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,225 a 
conglomerate of international mining companies headquartered 
in London supplied the government of Papau New Guinea with 
helicopters and other militarized vehicles to suppress a local 
uprising, culminating in the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre.226  
Then, in Papau New Guinea’s ensuing war, the mining 
companies allegedly perpetrated additional human rights abuses 
including the acts of “prevent[ing] medicine, clothing and other 
essential supplies from reaching the people.”227  The Red Cross 
estimated that over 2,000 children died due to the lack of 
medicine and other vaccines.228  American courts declined to hold 
the companies in Talisman and Rio Tinto liable, ruling that  
 
 
 
221 Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Mandatory Grounds for the 
Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United 
States, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2009); Alexander Zaitchik, Sludge Match: 
Inside Chevron’s $9 Billion Legal Battle with Ecuadorean Villagers, ROLLING STONE, 
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/sludge-match-chevron-
legal-battle-ecuador-steven-donziger-20140828 (detailing the history and legal battle 
of Chevron’s alleged atrocities committed in Ecuador). 
222 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
223 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 
296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
224 Id. 
225 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(2013). 
226 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1125–26 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 
aff’d, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g in 
part sub nom. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), on reh’g en 
banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), and on reh’g en 
banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Sarei v. 
Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. 
Ct. 1995 (2013). 
227 Id. at 1126 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
228 Id. 
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sovereignty and jurisdictional issues necessitated their 
dismissal.229  Indeed, this type of accountability is rarely imposed 
by courts of law.230 
In light of the extractive industry’s atrocities, 
nongovernmental organizations and concerned industry leaders 
have already enacted a few international agreements, ostensibly 
setting standards by which MNCs must follow.  For instance, 
forty-nine countries have ratified the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative231 (“EITI Standard”).  This agreement 
encourages signatories to increase industry openness, which 
some commentators suggest shames nations into abiding by 
acceptable standards.232  The agreement binds only nation states, 
not MNCs, and has been criticized for lacking enforcement 
mechanisms that can obligate parties to adhere to their 
commitments.233  Indeed, the EITI Standard omits an arbitration 
clause, or any similar mechanism, with the capacity to sanction 
transgressions.  Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) offers guidelines for 
responsible mineral extraction,234 and the Kimberley Process 
counters the illegal diamond trade, but each fails to either punish 
229 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 260 
(2d. Cir. 2009) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim that Talisman Energy conspired to 
commit human rights violations because, in part, the plaintiffs had failed to 
establish that international law provides a cause of action for conspiracy); Sarei v. 
Rio Tinto, PLC, 722 F.3d 1109, 1110 (2013) (dismissing the complaint in light of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013), that the Alien Tort Statute is presumed to have effect only as far as the 
United States’ sovereign borders). 
230 See supra notes 41–50 and accompanying text. 
231 EITI Countries, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, 
http://eiti.org/countries (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
232 Roya Ghafele & Angus Mercer, ‘Not Starting in Sixth Gear’: An Assessment of 
the U.N. Global Compact’s Use of Soft Law as a Global Governance Structure for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 41, 51 (2010) 
(finding that the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’s success is based 
upon “[n]aming and shaming” and that the companies that notably refuse to sign the 
agreement likely operate unsavory extractive industries, while those which 
voluntary comply with transparency receive reputational benefits). 
233 Extracting Oil, Burying Data: Energy Companies Are Fighting Efforts To 
Reveal Payments to Governments, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.econo 
mist.com/node/21548214 (restating criticism that the EITI “lacks bite” and that 
companies in the extractive industry seem to praise the agreement because it is 
“toothless”). 
234 OECD, Stakeholder Engagement Due Diligence in Extractive Industries: 
Overview of Draft User Guide, GLOBAL F. ON RESPONSIBLE BUS. CONDUCT 1 (2014). 
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violators or encourage compliance.235  Thus, considering the 
concentration of extractable resources in the developing world, 
the propensity of these corporations to violate human rights has 
been troubling.236 
But, it now appears that the extraction industry has become 
an especially ripe place for a human rights accord using 
international arbitration to resolve disputes.  The problem has 
been the “race to the bottom.”237  So long as there is a lack of 
meaningful ways to enforce labor and environmental standards, 
developing nations will continue to compete for international 
business by declining to enforce such regulations,238 though 
without doubt, few countries relish diminishing their quality of 
life to generate business.239  Considering that developed 
nations—whose consumer bases are the primary purchasers of 
extractive resources—are forming a groundswell of support in 
light of notable atrocities, the demand for such an extractive 
industry agreement appears present.240 
235 See Theo Leggett, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process Diamond 
Scheme, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16027011 
(recounting the decision by Global Witness to leave the Kimberley Process due to its 
ineffectiveness). 
236 See Tzeutschler, supra note 219, at 361–62. 
237 Chelsea M. Keeton, Comment, Sharing Sustainability: Preventing 
International Environmental Injustice in an Age of Regulation, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 
1167, 1171–72 (2012) (“The theory realizes that, as regulation heightens, costs of 
production also increase. Therefore, countries with less environmental protections 
(usually developing countries) gain a comparative advantage in production costs 
over more-developed countries with stricter environmental standards and 
enforcement. Developing countries are thus deemed ‘pollution havens’ for ‘dirty 
industries.’ This occurrence is also known as the ‘race to the bottom . . . .’ ” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
238 Id. 
239 See David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1343–44 (2008) (asserting that developing nations better 
compete for global scarce resources by improving environmental and labor standards 
and that most nations are endeavoring to “race to the top,” as opposed to the bottom, 
raising minimal standards of living). 
240 For example, publicized atrocities in the extractive industry by Canadian 
corporations prompted Canada to enact a free trade agreement with Colombia, 
authorizing annual reports detailing whether subsequent trade abides by, or 
transgresses, human rights. See Annual Report Pursuant to the Agreement 
Concerning Annual Reports on Human Rights and Free Trade Between Canada and 
the Republic of Colombia, EMBASSY OF CANADA TO COLOMBIA, http://www.canada 
international.gc.ca/colombia-colombie/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/AnnualReport_ 
RapportAnnuel-2013.aspx?lang=eng (last updated May 16, 2014); see also 
Canada/Colombia Free Trade Deal: Meaningless Consultation Process Sells Human 
Rights Short, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.amnesty.ca/news/news-rel 
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Another area concerns international water.  Oftentimes, 
MNCs operating in the developing world privatize local supplies, 
harming regions already suffering from a dearth of available 
water.241  In fact, MNCs often demand ownership of local 
waterways as a condition precedent to foreign direct investment, 
pitting the willingness of developing nations against each other 
to relinquish control over drinkable water.242  The problem is that 
earmarking water for private industry reduces access and raises 
the cost of the remaining supplies, creating crises when local 
populations cannot access or afford what is left.243  This industry 
also harms agriculture that depends upon the availability of 
water,244 killing 2.2 million people each year, the majority of 
whom being children.245  In fact, the International Labor Rights 
Forum circulated a list of the fourteen worst corporate human 
rights offenders; notably, two of the companies were identified for 
privatizing water in developing nations.246  For example, 
subsidiaries of Coca-Cola allegedly harmed agriculture and  
 
 
 
eases/canadacolombia-free-trade-deal-meaningless-consultation-process-sells-human 
(noting abuses by Canadian companies in the extractive industry, operating in the 
developing world). 
241 See generally Itzchak Kornfeld, A Global Water Apartheid: From Revelation 
to Resolution, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 701 (2010) (providing a detailed treatment 
of the nature of, and problems arising from, the privatization of water by MNCs). 
242 See Jennifer Naegele, What Is Wrong with Full-Fledged Water Privatization?, 
6 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 99, 106 (2004) (“[C]ountless nations and municipalities 
face pressure to privatize. Nations facing financial crises are often the most 
vulnerable to these pressures: desperate to stop the drain on state coffers of a failing 
water infrastructure, states are persuaded to privatize by private bidders and 
international lending institutions promising long-term investment, lower costs and 
access for all.” (footnote omitted)). 
243 See Kornfeld, supra note 241, at 710 (noting that in South Africa, the 
privatization of water has led to increased prices for water and that the populations 
that cannot afford the now more expensive water often turn to drinking water from 
lakes and rivers, increasing the rate by which South Africans are contracting cholera 
and other communicable diseases). 
244 Melina Williams, Note, Privatization and the Human Right to Water: 
Challenges for the New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 469, 469–70 (2007) (describing 
the need for drinkable water, its impact on agriculture, and the consequences 
rendered by water privatization). 
245 Naegele, supra note 242, at 99. 
246 The 14 Worst Corporate Evildoers, INT’L LAB. RTS. F. (Dec. 12, 2005), 
http://www.laborrights.org/in-the-news/14-worst-corporate-evildoers. 
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reduced clean water supplies in India,247 mirroring allegations 
directed at the French corporation Suez-Lyonnaise Des Eaux for 
acts in Latin America248 and South Africa.249 
Contributing to this problem is the absence of a legal 
regime—effective or otherwise—governing water rights.  While a 
handful of international human rights treaties mention access to 
water, including the Convention on the Rights of Children and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, none contemplates acts by 
MNCs.250  Since corporations are rarely subject to international 
law, MNCs cannot violate an individual’s right to water in the 
unlikely chance that such a standard even exists.251  Thus, 
considering that only states might have a duty, albeit an 
unenforceable one, to provide clean drinking water, private 
actors are largely free to privatize supplies in developing 
countries despite the consequences.252 
However, considering the buying power of western 
consumers and growing concerns raised by water privatization, 
the water industry seems to be an appropriate industry for 
regulation.  Since water depletion is often caused by the bottled 
water industry—as exemplified by Coca-Cola and Suez—the 
primary purchasers are generally wealthy westerners.  This has 
prompted the growth of socially conscious bottled water 
companies, indicating that political will and buying power is 
forming.253  For example, Starbucks sells Ethos Water, whose 
corporate mission includes providing clean drinking water to 
developing countries.254  It, thus, appears that the publicity 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Kornfeld, supra note 241, at 710–11. 
250 See Williams, supra note 244, at 472. 
251 Id. at 488–89. 
252 Tara Pistilli, Note, Women, Water & Privatization: A Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Global Water Governance, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 797, 800 (2014) 
(remarking that the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights is advocating for modern human rights regimes and scholarships to include 
access to drinking water into the framework). 
253 Brenda Keener, Socially Conscious Bottled Water, INSPIRED ECONOMIST, 
http://inspiredeconomist.com/2008/12/19/socially-conscious-bottled-water/ (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
254 Ethos Water Fund, STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/ 
community/ethos-water-fund (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (“Ethos Water was created 
to help raise awareness about this terrible crisis and provide children with access to 
clean water. Every time you buy a bottle of Ethos Water, you contribute $.05US 
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surrounding water privatization has unsettled the water 
industry, which could further inspire an international agreement 
among general drink retailers or specified countries or regions. 
B. Obstacles and Concerns Possibly Impeding Arbitration 
However, there are a number of obstacles that could prevent 
arbitration from becoming more prominent in human rights 
litigation.  The first concerns whether these tribunals will be 
willing or even adequate.  Recall that arbitral tribunals have yet 
to rule in a manner promoting human rights.255  This could be 
because arbitrators harbor doubts about whether they have the 
capacity or knowledge to resolve such disputes,256 or they could 
even lack the desire to do so.257  Especially considering that most 
international tribunals hear primarily commercial disputes, 
these misgivings may prove accurate.  The Bangladesh Accord 
could alleviate these concerns by resolving its initial disputes 
effectively, though the agreement’s arbitration mechanism has 
yet to be invoked.258 
Another hindrance could stem from opposition mounted by 
influential parties.  While voters, market bases, and human 
rights observers are likely to consent to more stringent human 
rights mechanisms, more may be needed.  For instance, MNCs 
are likely to oppose efforts to create greater business liability,259 
and developed nations could follow suit.260  Since developing 
nations seldom enforce environmental and labor standards as a 
means to attract foreign business and investment,261 some are  
 
 
($.10CN in Canada) to the Ethos Water Fund . . . . So far more than $12.3 million 
has been granted to help support water, sanitation and hygiene education programs 
in water-stressed countries—benefiting more than 500,000 people around the 
world.”). 
255 Peterson & Gray, supra note 19, at 5, 34–35 (noting that there are “no 
known” examples of an arbitral panel enforcing human rights). 
256 Email Interview with Michael D. Goldhaber, Senior International 
Correspondent, The American Lawyer (Feb. 27, 2015) (on file with author) 
(mentioning that international arbitrators are largely unfamiliar with human rights 
enforcement, considering they primary operate in other areas of law). 
257 Id. 
258 Skype Interview with Rob Wayss, supra note 188. 
259 Id.; Telephone Interview with Robert C. Thompson, supra note 192. 
260 Email Interview with Michael D. Goldhaber, supra note 256. 
261 See supra notes 237–39 and accompanying text. 
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likely to prefer the status quo.  While dissenting parties are 
unlikely to obstruct bilateral and other smaller-scale agreements, 
they could frustrate greater international regimes. 
The concept of human rights must also be better defined.262  
A frequent issue arising in alien tort statute cases concerns 
whether an act constitutes a human rights violation under 
international law.263  Considering that most international 
agreements define human rights rather broadly and without 
much description, it can be difficult to determine which behaviors 
are proscribed.  MNCs, in turn, are likely to contest contract 
terms creating liability without knowing whether an act 
transgresses the agreement.264  Thus, for this proposed contract 
mechanism to become more popular, it is imperative that future 
accords incorporate a more nuanced definition of human rights. 
In sum, the absence of prior accords merging arbitration and 
human rights is likely due to a perception that this development 
was impossible.  However, upon the Bangladesh Accord becoming 
the first effective representative agreement, the possibility, or 
even likelihood, that other industries sharing critical similarities 
with the apparel industry—including political will and buying 
power—could produce comparable agreements.  While this 
Article lists the mineral extraction and water industries as 
potential industries, other possibilities include the private 
security,265 migrant agriculture,266 and pharmaceutical 
262 Email Interview with Michael D. Goldhaber, supra note 256. 
263 See, e.g., Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(seeking a framework to determine which conducts violate the law of nations 
actionable under the Alien Tort Statute). 
264 Email Interview with Michael D. Goldhaber, supra note 256. 
265 See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Regulating the Privatized Security Industry: 
The Promise of Public/Private Governance, 63 EMORY L.J. 417, 417 (2013) (“As 
governments around the world increasingly turn to contractors to provide 
government services in the sphere of military and foreign affairs, significant 
problems of accountability arise. Traditional public governmental mechanisms of 
regulation and accountability, as well as accountability through litigation, are often 
inadequate or unavailable. International legal instruments similarly offer only 
minimal enforcement of human rights or other public-regarding norms, and in any 
event they may not always apply to nonstate actors.”); Charis Kamphuis, Foreign 
Investment and the Privatization of Coercion: A Case Study of the Forza Security 
Company in Peru, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 529, 529 (2012). 
266 See, e.g., Laura Niada, Hunger and International Law: The Far-Reaching 
Scope of the Human Right to Food, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 131, 182 (2006) 
(“[A]gribusiness transnational corporations exert an enormous amount of influence 
on land concentration and agricultural commodities prices. . . . [T]hey conspicuously 
control agricultural trade, processing and marketing. Global commodity markets are 
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industries,267 all of which have been accused of violating human 
rights.  That said, numerous obstacles could frustrate this 
development, including the malleable definition of human rights, 
the opposition of influential actors, and a lack of ability of 
political will from arbitral tribunals. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article seeks to accomplish both theoretical and 
practical goals.  On a practical level, this Article endeavors to 
explain a highly counterintuitive legal development.  MNCs are 
largely immune from tort lawsuits—including human rights 
abuses—committed in the developing world.  This is because 
courts in developing countries are often unable or unwilling to 
hold MNCs accountable, and western courts cannot assert 
jurisdiction due to a number of sovereignty and jurisdictional 
issues.  But despite this landscape, arbitration seems ready to 
become the preferred means to impose human rights standards 
on corporate actors.  This development may revolutionize the 
manner in which MNCs conduct business abroad, considering 
that never before recently has there been a process to legally 
encourage or demand corporation respect human rights in the 
developing world. 
Furthermore, the promise of arbitration in human rights 
litigation is no longer just theoretical.  Without much notice, 
several recent international agreements incorporated both 
arbitration and human rights terms, though it was not until the 
Bangladesh Accord that an agreement actually used a structure 
increasingly dominated by fewer global [MNCs] that have the power to demand low 
producer prices, while keeping consumer prices high, in turn increasing their profit 
margins. A World Bank study found that since 1974, agricultural commodity prices 
have fallen while consumer prices have increased, suggesting unfair trade in world 
commodity markets.” (footnote omitted)). 
267 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009). After 
American doctors working for Pfizer sought to test an experimental drug on one 
group of Nigerian children while giving a second group a control drug, appellants 
filed suit. Id. “Appellants contend that Pfizer knew that Trovan had never 
previously been tested on children . . . . Pfizer allegedly concluded the experiment 
and left without administering follow-up care. According to the appellants, the tests 
caused the deaths of eleven children, five of whom had taken Trovan and six of 
whom had taken the lowered dose of Ceftriaxone, and left many others blind, deaf, 
paralyzed, or brain-damaged.” Id.; see also Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: 
Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug Trials Through Market Exclusion, 57 
DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 880–82 (2008) (outlining the history of unethical drug testing, 
oftentimes constituting human rights abuses). 
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altering corporate behavior.  Considering that MNCs are in 
general compliance with the agreement, it seems that this 
enforcement mechanism is a success.268  Other organizations, 
groups, and industries are taking notice, foreshadowing a future 
in which private remedies become the most common means to 
promote human rights.  For instance, the United Nations 
recently discussed proposals about a corporate human rights 
regime using arbitration as a means to make it legally binding.  
Likewise, Olympic host nation contracts now include human 
rights clauses, enforced by binding international arbitration.  
And, pursuant to the Bangladesh Accord, other socially conscious 
industries and enterprises are likely to leverage companies into 
similar accords and agreements.  Accordingly, victims of human 
rights abuses may finally be able to seek relief using the least 
likely of mechanisms. 
This Article also contributes to the arbitration literature.  
General perceptions of private venues conceive it as a tool for 
corporations to take advantage of less sophisticated parties.  
Included herein is a more nuanced discussion of both domestic 
and international arbitration, explaining why the latter is 
amenable to human rights litigation.  It seems that due to the 
efficacy of the New York Convention, international arbitration 
probably represents the sole avenue which can incentivize 
corporations to adopt socially responsible behaviors in the 
developing world; this is in stark contrast to arbitration’s popular 
reputation. 
The theoretical contribution involves understanding why the 
arbitral process is superior to courts of law.  Indeed, the 
perception is that courts of law lack the ingenuity or political will 
to draft laws creating international human rights standards.  
The reality is that the courts must avoid adjudicating these types 
of disputes because they may threaten another nation’s 
sovereignty and, thus, spark international conflict.  In other 
words, political and practical concerns make courts of law 
particularly poor venues to try human rights claims, as well as 
other foreign corporate torts.  But, since arbitral tribunals are 
private actors—able to act without threatening the same  
 
 
268 Skype Interview with Rob Wayss, supra note 188. 
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international crises—they can hear certain disputes that courts 
may not.  Thus, arbitral awards are, at times, superior to judicial 
rulings. 
 
